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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
In this study an attempt is made to trace the history of one particularly pervasive and 
influential theme in political and legal thought of twelfth- and thirteenth century Norway: the 
association of the laws with the name of St Óláfr, the patron of the realm and of the royal 
family. It manifests itself in different guises in the liturgical commemoration of the saint king, 
in the tradition of secular history-writing, in the books of laws, and in the rituals of the 
kingship. On closer inspection, we may discern a number of individual motifs that, being 
inextricably interwoven with one another, constitute this theme when it reaches the peak of its 
development: 
a) a belief that during the years of his reign, King Óláfr promulgated laws that embodied 
justice and equity; 
b) these laws were committed to writing, at least in part, either by the saint king himself 
or by the posterity, and may presently be found in an ancient law-book; 
c) Óláfr’s legislation is still the Norwegian kingdom’s valid law; 
d) the rulers and the subjects alike are bound by these laws; 
e) these laws, however, may fall for a while into oblivion or disregard, and it becomes 
necessary then to restore them. 
This theme was by no means unique to Norway. Other political communities of the medieval 
West vested their identity in legendary laws of great rulers of the past. Parallels between the 
symbolical function of such notions as lög hins helga Óláfs in Norway, laga Eadwardi in 
Norman and Angevin England, and Karls recht in the Empire have long attracted the attention 
of scholars. They have voiced widely differing opinions as to the origin and significance of 
this phenomenon. It has been suggested, on the one hand, that the image of a legendary 
lawgiver was but a particular manifestation of a specific conception of law inherent in the 
popular mind, a conception in which there was no room for distinction between positive and 
ideal law, between law and morals, and the validity of all law essentially depended on its age 
and goodness. On the other hand, it has been argued that the figure of a legendary lawgiver 
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was engineered by the church and subsequently utilized by the royal power, which legitimized 
its growing ambitions by an appeal to his laws. 
The present study of the phenomenon of a legendary lawgiver taking its point of departure 
in the Norwegian material, is intended as a contribution to this ongoing debate. Certain 
aspects of the problem seem to call for further examination. A number of questions are 
connected with the genesis of the notion of the “laws of St Óláfr”: What was the relation 
between contemporary reactions to King Óláfr Haraldsson’s lawmaking and the subsequent 
growth of the legend? When did his reign become a reference point with which usages and 
customs of the day were compared and judged? How early did the tendency manifest itself to 
indiscriminately attribute all old-established law to Óláfr? How significant was the impact of 
the intellectual tradition of the learned law on the formation of this notion? Another group of 
questions concern the significance of the theme: How did the notion of the “laws of St Oláfr” 
function in political and legal life of medieval Norway? Which part did they play in conflicts 
between individuals or social groups? How was it utilized in legitimizing all sorts of claims? 
Finally, it is necessary to attempt to situate the notion of the “laws of St Óláfr” in the broader 
context of the contemporary attitudes towards law and legislation generally. 
As we can see, the questions regarding the topic are numerous, but it will not be sufficient 
to limit the investigation to explicating the empirical material. It is also necessary provide an 
analysis of divergent approaches to the phenomenon of a legendary lawgiver and to the 
medieval conceptions of law generally in order to understand which areas regarding this topic 
particularly are in need of further research and acquaint the reader with the conceptual 
framework within which our investigation will be conducted. Additionally, a comprehensive 
discussion spanning the history of the debate will hopefully illuminate areas of mutual 
misunderstanding and provide a basis for a more fruitful dialogue in the future. 
A few words are in order concerning the plan for this study. It opens with the survey of 
previous scholarship (chapter 1), followed by two chapters discussing the development of the 
notion of the “laws of St Óláfr” from the eleventh century to the end of King Hákon 
Hákonarson’s reign. One of them focuses on the question of the origins of the notion. The 
continuity between Óláfr’s image among his contemporaries and the subsequent 
hagiographical tradition is discussed on the example of Sighvatr Þórðarson’s verse. The 
following section provides an analysis of references to the legal status as it was in the “days of 
King Óláfr the Saint” in Frostuþingsbók. Further, the réttarbót of kings Haraldr and Magnús 
stipulating that the “laws of St Óláfr” are to be maintained comes under scrutiny. Finally, an 
attempt is made to interpret the meaning of the division into the “Óláfr” text and the 
 7
“Magnús” text in the revised version of Gulaþingsbók dating from the reign of King Magnús 
Erlingsson. 
The other chapter is concerned with the history of the motif in the century between 1160s 
and 1260s. In the opening section we discuss the picture of St Óláfr’s legislation painted in 
the ecclesiastical literature about the saint king and the impact on it of the contemporary 
juristic theories. The two following section investigate the role which an appeal to the “laws 
of St Ólafr” played in legitimizing claims to the throne in Sverris saga and Hákonar saga 
Hákonarsonar. The chapter closes with an analysis of the motif of “renovation” of the saint 
king’s law in the legislation of the late years of King Hákon’s reign. 
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CHAPTER   1 
The “Good Old Law” 
Fritz Kern, His Follows, and His Critics 
 
 
 
 
The German historian Fritz Kern (1884-1950) was probably the first to bring the figure of 
a legendary legislator into full prominence in the discussion of medieval legal thought. In the 
picture of the medieval idea of law that he painted, the laws of a “mythological lawgiver” as 
he termed this personage typified the essential difference in values and attitudes between that 
epoch and our own time. The theories that Kern put forward early in the twentieth century are 
still influential in the study of the subject, and it is necessary to discuss them in some detail. 
Kern’s field was what in German tradition is called “constitutional history” 
(Verfassungsgeschichte), the study of the society mainly from the angle of the public 
authority and institutions,1 and it was in an attempt to elucidate a complex problem in the 
history of the medieval “constitution” (Verfassung) that he first developed his views on the 
specific nature of the medieval law. In his book Gottesgnadentum und Widerstansrecht im 
früheren Mittelalter (1914) Kern gave a penetrating analysis of two seemingly contradictory 
trends in medieval political thought: exaltation of the king’s power, based on the hereditary 
title and ecclesiastical consecration, on the one hand, and assertion of the subjects’ right, 
under certain circumstances, to resist and ultimately overthrow the monarch, on the other.2 
According to Kern, the paradox was resolved through the fundamental principle of the king’s 
limitation by the laws, a principle that was inherent in both the doctrine of the church and the 
Germanic tradition, although with some significant difference of accent.3 While the 
ecclesiastical teaching laid stress on the monarch’s subordination to ideal law, the law of 
nature and the divine law,4 in the Germanic thought the limitation rested on another 
understanding of law, which Kern tried to elucidate. Already in Gottesgnadentum und 
                                                 
1 František Graus, “Verfassungsgeschichte des Mittelalters,” Historische Zeitschrift 243 (1983) 543–46, is a 
particularly lucid statement of the distinctive character of this branch of German-speaking historiography. 
2 Fritz Kern, Gottesgnadentum und Widerstandsrecht im früheren Mittelalter, Mittelalterliche Studien, vol. 1, 
pt. 2 (Leipzig: Koehler, 1914). The book was translated by S. B. Chrimes in Fritz Kern, Kingship and Law in the 
Middle Ages, Studies in Mediaeval History, vol. 4 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1939), pp. 1–146, with omission of 
almost all the numerous footnotes and appendixes. 
3 Kern, Gottesgndentum, pp. vi, 142, 146-47. 
4 Kern, Gottesgndentum, pp. 143-45, 147, 310. 
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Widerstandsrecht he indicated what its distinctive character consisted in, but it was only a few 
years later, in his article “Recht und Verfassung im Mittelalter” (1919), that Kern’s views on 
the matter assumed their final shape.5 
The idea of law, which he set out to elucidate here, was the one of popular belief. He took 
little interest in reconstructing “primal Germanic” legal thought, not affected with the “taint” 
of Christianity; “Germanic”, in Kern’s usage, seems to be primarily opposed to Roman legal 
culture, re-discovered in the High Middle Ages and expounded by learned jurisprudence.6 
Kern’s “Germanic law” is a product of an essentially oral culture and the transition to legal 
practices based on written record eroded ultimately its identity. In other words, Kern was 
chiefly concerned with legal conceptions that dominated in the earlier part of the Middle 
Ages, although as he pointed out, similar notions survived in the “naïve perception” well into 
modern times.7 
Indicating the theme central to the entire argument of “Recht und Verfassung”, Kern 
contrasted the medievals’ understanding of law to legal positivism dominating the 
jurisprudence of his own day. “For us law needs only one attribute in order to give it validity; 
it must, directly or indirectly, be sanctioned by the State. Mediaeval law could dispense with 
the sanction of the State but not with the two qualities of Age and Goodness… If law were not 
old and good law, it was not law at all, even though it were formally enacted by the State.”8 
In brief, Kern’s theory may be summarized as follows: For law to be law, it had to be 
“good”, “just”, and “reasonable”. Its other attribute, its age, was a necessary implication of its 
goodness: “What is equitable must somehow be traceable back to the eternal order of things. 
The old law is reasonable, and reasonable law is old.”9 It is understandable, therefore, that the 
mere passing-away of years by itself could not create or reveal law. In a sense, the “good old 
law” was timeless, and “when law [was] called ‘old’, it [was] rather a description of its high 
                                                 
5 Fritz Kern, “Recht und Verfassung im Mittelalter,” Historische Zeitschrift 120 (1919) 1-79, translated by S. B. 
Chrimes in Fritz Kern, Kingship and Law, pp. 147–205, without the important Introduction and a part of the 
footnotes. 
6 Kern, “Recht und Verfassung,” pp. 1, 5, 7, 26. 
7 Kern, “Recht und Verfassung,” pp. 16, 18, 27–31, 32, 41, 43, 77–79. 
8 See Kern, “Recht und Verfassung,” p. 3; Kingship and Law, p. 149. For other examples of setting in opposition 
medieval law and the positivist theory see “Recht und Verfassung,” pp.  9–12, 13, 16 42–43. On Kern’s thesis as 
a reaction to positivism and on some points of similarity between the picture of medieval law in “Recht und 
Verfassung” and the views voiced in the same years by the opponents of the positivist doctrine 
(Freirechtsschule) see particularly the penetrating remarks of Gerhard Theuerkauf, Lex, Speculum, Compendium 
Iuris: Rechtsaufzeichnung und Rechtsbewußtsein in Norddeutschland vom 8. bis zum 16. Jahrhundert, 
Forschungen zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, vol. 6 (Cologne and Graz: Böhlau, 1968), pp. 23–26: “Das 
Gegenbild, das Fritz Kern zum mittelalterlichen Rechtsbewußtsein entworfen hat, ist der Gesetzpositivismus, 
also eine extreme Rechtsauffassung. Dem extremen Gegenbild entspricht ein extremes Bild der mittelalterlichen 
Rechtsanschauung.” 
9 Kern, “Recht und Verfassung,” p. 6; Kingship and Law, p. 152. 
 10
quality than a strict determination of its age.”10 Old law broke new law because only old law 
was law. The ultimate source of law was God. Men could neither create nor abolish law; they 
could only “discover” it, or conversely, obscure and violate it. All legislation and legal reform 
were only permissible as the restoration of the “good old law” that had fallen into oblivion or 
abuse. Law itself remained unchangeable.11 Having no date of enactment and no date of 
repeal, the “good old law” simply existed. It resided in the legal conscience of the community. 
Consequently, knowing it required neither special training nor law-books. 
In Kern’s opinion, the legendary laws of a great ruler of the past like Óláfr, Edward, or 
Charlemagne, epitomized the medieval perception of law just described: 
The [mythological] law-giver is thought of not so much as an arbitrary law-maker as rather a 
specially strong and clear revealer of the True and the Good. God is the only law-giver in the 
fullest sense of the term. The law reveals itself, so to speak, in the wise rulers of early times. 
Even they do not create it; they bring it into day-light, and put men under its dominion… But 
because they are in some sense prophets or heroes, they surpass the mass of humans in their 
closeness to God, and as they possess superhuman powers, they themselves may well be 
venerated as makers of law… The law of the mythical law-giver was not even written; on the 
contrary it was exceedingly plastic and ill-defined; all that is good had a place in it; all that is 
bad was a later deviation from it and a corruption of it, and must be removed.12 
It is important to place Kern’s theory of the medieval “good old law” in its proper 
historiographic context. No doubt, this theory had deep roots in German historical 
jurisprudence of the nineteenth century. However, it was not so much the mainstream of the 
so-called “Historical School” dominating the field as a somewhat divergent tradition of 
thought represented by Jacob Grimm and Otto von Gierke that served as a point of departure 
for the argument of “Recht und Verfassung”.13 Unlike the majority of their colleagues who 
considered the law of the past chiefly from the viewpoint of its potential relevance for the 
full-scale legal reforms of their day, Grimm and von Gierke attempted to bring into relief the 
profound alterity of medieval legal thought, a theme that would later pervade “Recht und 
                                                 
10 Kern, “Recht und Verfassung,” p. 18; Kingship and Law, p. 160. 
11 Kern’s views on this matter seem to have undergone a change. In Gottesgnadentum und Widerstandsrecht he 
expressed an opinion that “the medieval Germanic notion of law … did not in the ultimate analysis envisage any 
downright unalterable rules; it claimed only that no change in existing conditions should take place unilaterally, 
without the free assent of those whose rights were affected”. In “Recht und Verfassung” he restricted the sphere 
in which the creation of new rights had been possible to cases such as grants made by the king from his own 
possessions when rights of a third party were in no way affected, see Kern, Gottesgnadentum, pp. 148–49, and 
“Recht und Verfassung,” pp. 5, 6, 24, 26. 
12 Kern, “Recht und Verfassung,” pp. 14–15; Kingship and Law, pp. 157–58. 
13 See particularly Gerhard Köbler, Das Recht im frühen Mittelalter, Untersuchungen zu Herkunft und Inhalt 
frühmittelalterlicher Rechtsbegriffe im deutschen Sprachgebiet, Forschungen zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, 
vol. 7 (Cologne and Vienna: Böhlau, 1971), pp. 12–18. 
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Verfassung”.14 Kern also shared many of Grimm and von Gierke’s opinions about individual 
aspects of the medieval idea of law. Their view that in the Middle Ages the law was 
conceived of as the common patrimony of the whole folk (in the same way as folk-song, folk-
belief, and folk-speech were) is clearly recognizable in Kern’s emphasis on the communal 
nature of the “good old law”. Also, the theory of the medieval syncretism of the legal, the 
religious, the ethical, and the poetic, as well as the picture of the quasi-sacred law not subject 
to human will, mark a noticeable continuity between the three authors.15 
Kern’s conception of medieval law included other elements that can be traced to the 
works of his predecessors and contemporaries. It will be enough to mention a few most 
important of them. In his book about the role of custom in the legal thought of the Middle 
Ages Siegfried Brie argued that the medieval Germans had always attached much weight to 
the age of a given legal provision, and emphasized that a differentiation between “lawful” and 
“unlawful” customs had been inherent in German legal tradition.16 At the time Kern was 
writing his Gottesgnadentum und Widerstandsrecht and “Recht und Verfassung”, ideas 
broadly resembling his thesis were also voiced in anglophone scholarship. Like Kern, the 
British scholars R. W. and A. J. Carlyle emphasized difference between the modern and the 
medieval perception of law pointing out that the “conception that a law represents a mere 
command of a lawgiver, or even of a community,” had been “wholly foreign to the Middle 
Ages.”17 The Carlyle brothers and their American colleague Charles McIlwain identified 
medieval law with custom and asserted that it had not, in the contemporary understanding, 
been conceived of as made by men, but rather as inherited from time immemorial. The 
medievals’ had looked on this customary law as embodiment of the principles of justice, and 
therefore, it had been inviolable: rules inconsistent with this fundamental law had been void. 
Consequently, medieval legislative procedure had served not so much to express human will 
as to record that which had been recognised as already binding upon men.18 
                                                 
14 Cf. Gerhard Dilcher, “Mittelalterliche Rechtsgewohnheit als methodisch-theoretisches Problem,” in 
Gewohnheitsrecht und Rechtsgewohnheiten im Mittelalter, Schriften zur europäischen Rechts- und 
Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 6 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1992), pp. 32, 34–36. 
15 Jacob Grimm, “Von der poesie im recht,” in his Kleinere Schriften, 8 vols. (Berlin: Dümmler, 1864–90) 6: 
152–91, originally published in 1816; Otto von Gierke, Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, 4 vols. (Berlin: 
Weidmann, 1868–1913) 2: 12–14, 126–27. 
16 Brie, Gewohnheitsrecht, pp. 225–51. 
17 R. W. Carlyle and A. J. Carlyle, A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West, 6 vols. (Edinburgh and 
London: Blackwood, 1903–36) 3: 41. 
18 R. W. Carlyle and A. J. Carlyle, History 3: 41, 45, 183–84; 6: 507; C. H. McIlwain, The High Court of 
Parliament and its Supremacy: An Historical Essay on the Boundaries between Legislation and Adjudication in 
England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1910), pp. vii–viii, 51–52; The Growth of Political Thought in the 
West from the Greeks to the End of the Middle Ages (New York: Macmillan, 1932), pp. 184–88. 
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However, Kern did not just synthesize and developed views on the medieval law which 
had already been present in the previous scholarship, but also attempted to show how this 
perception of law had conditioned patterns of exercise of power in the Middle Ages. In this 
respect Kern’s ideas proved extremely fecund for the next generation of historians who 
launched a vigorous attack on the conceptions of the traditional Verfassungsgeschichte.19 One 
of the principal figures in this movement, the Austrian scholar Otto Brunner, argued, against 
the grain of previous scholarship, that feuds of local aristocracy far from having been just 
disorderly outbursts of violence had formed an intrinsic part of medieval legal order and had 
been conceived of by the contemporaries as the defence of traditional rights grounded in the 
“good old law”.20 The intellectual climate of Nazi Germany significantly furthered the success 
of the doctrines developed by Brunner and his cohort with their emphasis on the role of 
leadership, charisma, and community in history as well as the concomitant shift of focus from 
the study of social and political institutes to that of the “constitutional reality” in the sense of 
Carl Schmitt’s legal philosophy.21 Despite the subsequent defeat of the National Socialist 
regime, the influence of the new historical conceptions easily survived in academic circles of 
the German-speaking countries and contributed to the growing vogue of the theory of the 
medieval “good old law” among students of history and historical jurisprudence alike. In the 
course of a few years it gained entrance into all major textbooks of legal history.22 
This story is immediately relevant to the understanding of the on-going heated debate over 
Kern’s hypotheses in post-war German historiography that has noticeably affected the study 
of Scandinavian medieval law. The new generation of academics that began their carrier in 
the 60s was deeply concerned with the recent past of their country and their field of 
research.23 It is well conceivable that the concept of the “good old law” seemed to them in 
some sense associable with the slogans of Nazi ideologues about the identity of law with the 
“popular sentiment” (Volksempfinden), the proclamations about the “natural law of the 
community” residing “in the call of the blood and in the innermost of the sound mind,” and 
the sweeping assertions that “political constitution is not the written constitutional norms but 
                                                 
19 Graus, “Verfassungsgeschichte des Mittelalters,” pp. 554–55. 
20 Otto Brunner, Land und Herrschaft, Grundfragen der territorialen Verfassungsgeschichte Südostdeutschlands 
im Mittelalter, 3rd rev. ed. (Brünn, Munich, and Vienna: Rohrer, 1943), pp. 150–65. 
21 See Graus, “Verfassungsgeschichte des Mittelalters,” pp. 559–69; W. Pohl, “Herrschaft,” in RGA 14 (1999) 
445–47, 449–50. 
22 See references in Köbler, Das Recht im frühen Mittelalter, pp. 20–21. 
23 See the remarks of Michael Stolleis in his The Law under the Swastika, Studies on Legal History in Nazi 
Germany, transl. Thomas Dunlap (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 10–11 and 42. 
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the foundational living order”.24 The participants in the debate never openly brought up such a 
link, to be sure. It is symptomatic, however, that the first and most resolute critics of the 
“good old law” theory, Klaus von See, Karl Kroeschell, and Gerhard Köbler, never failed to 
cite not only Fritz Kern himself but also the writings of Otto Brunner and the German jurist 
Walter Merk, although neither had added anything of significance to Kern’s hypothesis as 
such.25 A part of the explanation for this seemingly strange regard may lie in the fact that both 
had had ideological affiliations with the fascists, Merk notoriously, Brunner in a more oblique 
fashion.26 The case of Brunner was more complex than that, though. As we have indicated 
above, he had developed his own historical conception drawing far-reaching implications 
from the idea of the “good old law”. Therefore, for persistent critics of his overall viewpoint 
like von See and Kroeschell27 it was necessary to disprove this premise together with other 
assumptions of Brunner and his cohort about lordship, fealty, and following in the Middle 
Ages. It is important to bear in mind this para-scientific background in order to understand 
why, for example, von See should have been at pains to refute the “good old law” theory in 
relation to medieval Scandinavian sources, even though nobody had actually applied it to 
them before. 
It is curious that there had been virtually no serious criticism of Kern’s conception within 
the fifty year interval between the publication of his Gottesgnadentum und Wiederstansrecht 
                                                 
24 Hans-Helmut Dietze, Naturrecht in der Gegenwart (1936), p. 317–18; Ernst Rudolf Huber, Vom Sinn der 
Verfassung (1935), pp. 6–7: “Die politische Verfassung ist nicht die geschriebene Verfassungsnorm, sondern die 
lebendige Grundordnung, in der das Volk geschichtliche Form gewinnt und zum Staate wird… Die Verfassung 
als lebendige Ordnung bedarf der formalgesetzlichen Normierung nicht; sie entsteht nicht durch Normen, 
sondern durch Taten”; both authors are quoted via Fritz Loos and Hans-Ludwig Schreiber, “Recht, 
Gerechtigkeit,” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in 
Deutschland, ed. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck, 8 vols. in 9 (Stuttgart: Klett, 1972–97) 5: 
306. See also Stolleis, The Law under the Swastika, pp. 20 –21, 87–101, 110, and Joachim Rückert, “Der 
Rechtsbegriff der Deutschen Rechtsgeschichte in der NS-Zeit: der Sieg des ‘Lebens’ und des konkreten 
Ordnungsdenkens, seine Vorgeschichte und seine Nachvirkungen,” in Die Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte in der NZ-
Zeit, ihre Vorgeschichte und ihre Nachwirkungen, ed. Joachim Rückert und Dietmar Willoweit (Tübingen: 
Mohr, 1995), pp. 177–240. 
25 See Klaus von See, Altnordische Rechtswörter, Philologische Studien zur Rechtsauffassung und 
Rechtsgesinnung der Germanen, Hermaea, n.s., vol. 16 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1964), p. 73 and n. 3, p. 77 n. 27, 
p. 84 n. 45; Karl Kroeschell, “Recht und Rechtsbegriff des 12. Jahrhunderts,” in Probleme des 12. Jahrhunderts, 
Vorträge und Forschungen, vol. 12 (Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 1968), p. 324 n. 146; Köbler, Das Recht im frühen 
Mittelalter, pp. 19–20. 
26 See Robert Jütte, “Zwischen Ständestaat und Austrofascismus: Der Beitrag Otto Brunners zur 
Geschichtsschreibung,” Jahrbuch des Instituts für deutsche Geschichte 13 (1984) 237–62; Harald Kahlenberg, 
Leben und Werk des Rechtshistorikers Walther Merk: Ein Beispiel für das Verhältnis von Rechtsgeschichte und 
Nationalsozialismus, Rechtshistorische Reihe, vol. 34 (Frankfurt a/M.: Lang, 1996). 
27 Klaus von See, Das skandinavische Königtum des frühen und hohen Mittelalters, Ein Beitrag zum Problem 
des mittelalterlichen Staates, Diss. (Hamburg, 1953), now published in an abridged form as Königtum und Staat 
im skandinavischen Mittelalter, Skandinavische Arbeiten, vol. 19 (Heidelberg: Winter, 2002); Karl Kroeschell, 
Haus und Herrschaft im frühen deutschen Recht, Göttinger rechtswissenschaftliche Studien, vol. 70 (Göttingen: 
Schwartz, 1968), and “Die Treue in der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte,” Studi medievali, ser. 3, vol. 10 (1969) 
465–89. 
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and von See’s Altnordische Rechtswörter (1964). At most, the revisionists were able to build 
on the “discrete results” of the previous research that could be taken to “contradict Fritz 
Kern’s doctrine.”28 For example, Wilhelm Ebel had pointed out that the earlier Middle Ages 
had known nothing of the figure of a “mythical lawgiver”, a fact which is certainly significant 
for us.29 Also, Hermann Krause had studied “endurance and transience in medieval law” and 
demonstrated that there had existed a noticeable tendency to repeatedly seek confirmation of 
grants of liberty or immunity, judicial decisions, etc. It had seemingly implied the principle 
that “the law must be as new as possible” had operated at least in certain spheres of medieval 
legal life, particularly in the domain of privilege rights.30 However, Krause himself had 
interpreted this tendency as a consequence of the medievals’ recognition of the lack of 
validity inherent in all new legal arrangements and as a resulting attempt to compensate for it 
by personally binding each new ruler through an act of confirmation of his predecessor’s 
promises. According to Krause, formulas of perpetuity and guarantees of permanence 
ubiquitous in documents of that time had also, paradoxically enough, pointed to the same 
basic mistrust of new law, which had been just another avatar of the “good old law” 
thinking.31 All in all, it is clear that however by itself stimulating the works of Ebel and 
Krause may have been for further research into medieval legal history, neither of them had 
attempted anything more than retouching one or another facet of Kern’s portrait of medieval 
law. 
The vigorous attack launched in the 60s on the doctrine of the “good old law” was but one 
particular manifestation of a general change of theoretical paradigm in post-war German-
speaking historiography. It had begun with Felix Genzmer’ paper about kinship structures 
(1950), Hans Kuhn’s paper about following (1956), and František Graus’ papers about fealty 
(1959 and 1966). These scholars had strongly criticized the conceptions developed by 
adherents of the new “constitutional history” such as Otto Brunner and Walter Schlesinger, 
and above all, their basic premise of a far-reaching continuity of Germanic patterns in 
medieval social, political, and legal life.32 Significantly, the challenge had first come from 
                                                 
28 Köbler, Das Recht im frühen Mittelalter, pp. 25–26. Cf. Johannes Liebrecht, “Das gute alte Recht in der 
rechtshistorischen Kritik,” in Funktion und Form: Quellen und Methodenprobleme der mittelalterlichen 
Rechtsgeschichte, ed. Karl Kroeschell und Albrecht Cordes, Schriften zur Europäischen Rechts- und 
Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 18 (Berlin: Dunker & Humblot, 1996), pp. 188–94. 
29 Wilhelm Ebel, Geschichte der Gesetzgebung in Deutschland, 2nd rev. ed., Göttinger Rechtswissenschaftliche 
Studien, vol. 24 (Göttingen: Schwartz, 1958), p. 12. 
30 Hermann Krause, “Dauer und Vergänglichkeit im mittelalterlichen Recht,” ZRG GA 75 (1958) 221–17. 
31 Krause, “Dauer und Vergänglichkeit,” pp. 217, 219, 221, 223, 226, 227–229. 
32 See a discussion and references in Graus, “Verfassungsgeschichte des Mittelalters,” pp. 569–72; Pohl, 
“Herrschaft,” pp. 447–53. 
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outside the field: Genzmer and Kuhn were primarily Germanic philologists. Also a 
philologist, Stefan Sonderegger, had given another important intellectual impulse to the 
coming critical assessment of the “good old law” theory in his study of the language of early 
medieval law, questioning the assumption of its affinity with Germanic poetic tradition.33 This 
assumption, dating back to Jacob Grimm and shared, among others, by Fritz Kern, had been 
the cornerstone of the widely accepted view of medieval law of Germanic nations as 
essentially popular and, importantly too, distinct from the “soulless rationalism” of Roman 
law.34 
Linguistic arguments played a crucial role in the criticism of the conception of the “good 
old law”, too. Klaus von See scrutinized Fritz Kern’s hypothesis in regard to Scandinavian 
medieval sources in his far-ranging study of their terminology relating to the notions of law 
and right, legal order and legal ethic (1964). Although Kern himself had only been marginally 
concerned with Scandinavia, its medieval laws had commonly been considered in German 
scholarship as a sort of repository of everything genuinely Germanic. Therefore, von See 
could regard his inquiry totally legitimate, even though no attempts had actually been made to 
interpret Scandinavian sources in terms of Kern’s theory: “If [the notion of] ‘folk-law’, the 
predilection for the ‘customary law’ and the ‘good old law’ is not only a medieval and West 
Germanic, but indeed an ancient and common Germanic characteristic, then it should be 
particularly likely to find it in Scandinavian laws.”35 Von See pointed out that such 
expressions as góðr réttr or góð lög were virtually absent from the texts. He also noticed that 
in Scandinavian collections of laws instances when the terms réttr and lög were qualified as 
forn or gamall were fairly few, too. In his opinion, even such examples of forn or gamall réttr 
as there were could not be taken to support Kern’s conception, since the word réttr referred in 
these contexts not to any “good” or “old” legal norm but simply to a personal claim or a 
prerogative. However, none of the examples he cited seems to be as clear-cut as he 
maintained, nor is it quite clear how it would contradict Kern’s understanding of medieval law 
that all sorts of subjective rights were legitimized through the assertion of their high age.36 
                                                 
33 Stefan Sonderegger, “Die Sprache des Rechts im Germanischen,” Schweizer Monatshefte 42 (1962–63) 259–
71. 
34 Cf. Klaus von See, Altnordische Rechtswörter, p. 77, and Deutsche Germanen-Ideologie vom Humanismus bis 
zur Gegenwart (Frankfurt a/M.: Athenäum, 1970), pp. 49–52. 
35 von See, Altnordische Rechtswörter, p. 77. 
36 According to von See, Altnordische Rechtswörter, pp. 34: “die genannten Belege meinen vielmehr immer so 
etwas wie ‘Vorrecht, persönliches Anspruch’, der nicht durch Rechtsnormen, sondern durch sein bloßes 
Vorhandsein legitimiert ist: er bleibt, weil er schon vorher – vor der jetzt bestehenden Rechtsordnung – da war” 
(cf. p. 96). What exactly we are to make of this assertion, remains unclear, particularly when none of the texts he 
cited explicitly mentions or even drops a hint that there have been any changes in the legal order, which might 
affect the position of the parties. 
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Further, von See suggested that sometimes such collocations as forn / gamal lög did not need 
to imply anything more than a non-appraisive juxtaposition of older provisions with those in 
current use. He had to concede, however, that there were also other examples in which the 
idea was expressed that “because the rule is old, it needs no justification.” Even though in 
some cases the context was perfectly secular,37 von See insisted that the idea of the “good old 
law” had slipped into Scandinavian sources through clerical influence.38 In his opinion, the 
figure of a “legendary lawgiver” had initially been absent from Scandinavian legal tradition, 
and the tendency to ascribe this role to St Óláfr had developed only gradually.39 Finally, as 
von See pointed out, there was no indication in the sources of the idea that laws or judicial 
judgements had been “found” in accord with Kern’s conception, but on the contrary, there 
was no lack of references to self-conscious lawmaking.40 
Not confining himself to the criticism of various aspects of the “good old law” theory as 
such in its application to Scandinavian material, von See also brought into question a number 
of basic assumptions about medieval laws of the Nordic countries, which were conceptually 
related to Kern’s ideas. First, the notion that medieval law was essentially popular came under 
von See’s critical scrutiny. He pointed out that there was no special term in Old Norse to 
denote “folk-law”, that alliterating formulas commonly considered as a manifestation of the 
folk spirit were most frequent in legal texts of a late date, and that the whole idea that the laws 
should be readily understandable to the common people had its origins in the doctrines of 
medieval canonists. In his view, knowledge of the laws in the society of medieval 
Scandinavia had always been confined to a small group of law experts.41 Second, von See 
examined the group of Old Norse terms that related to the concept of “customary law” 
(siðvenja, siðvani, etc.) and came to the conclusion that the idea that all laws and legal 
institutes were and should be an expression of the customs of a given country and its people, 
had stemmed from the canon law and had not corresponded to the self-understanding of the 
Scandinavian legal tradition. He admitted that in a wide range of situations the laws had 
invoked custom and usage, but the custom in question had neither been the “customary law” 
                                                 
37 As for example, in the article of Grágás where the laws relating to truce-breaking in Iceland and in other 
Nordic countries were compared and the divergence of the Icelandic practice was grounded in its antiquity 
(“That is ancient law in our country… But in Norway and wherever the Norse language is spoken it is law…”), 
cited in von See, Altnordische Rechtswörter, p. 97. 
38 von See, Altnordische Rechtswörter, pp. 96–98, 252. 
39 von See, Altnordische Rechtswörter, pp. 98–100. 
40 von See, Altnordische Rechtswörter, pp. 101–02, 251–52. 
41 von See, Altnordische Rechtswörter, pp. 57–63, 77–92, 252. Unfortunately, the German scholar did not 
express any opinion as to whether the we-style of the Norwegian books of laws pointed to the same thin layer of 
men of law. 
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nor individual “legal customs” but simply “some concrete particularity”, something that 
differed from place to place and therefore required a “variable application of a given general 
rule”.42 Altogether, the whole picture of medieval Scandinavian law that von See painted in 
his study was profoundly different from the traditional conception: it was individualistic in its 
roots, thoroughly pragmatic, and mundane law. 
The study of von See stimulated the opening of a discussion concerning the relevance of 
Kern’s “good old law” to early medieval legal sources on the Continent. In 1968 Karl 
Kroeschell pointed out that there was no indication in the language of the texts that law had 
been conceived of as immutable. Even the term ēwa ‘law’, which, due to its presumed 
etymological affinity with Latin aevum, Greek αι̃ω̃ν, and Gothic aiws ‘eternity, long time’, 
was frequently invoked by scholars as a positive proof that law had been eternal and 
unchangeable in Germanic perception, was actually devoid of such associations in the 
contemporary usage and could appear in collocations like êa scepphara ‘lawmaker’ and êue 
kepandi ‘lawgiver’. In general, the medievals were totally comfortable with the idea that law 
could be created from scratch.43 Initially, age had no particular significance for legitimizing 
laws. However, it played a major part in the theory of custom (consuetudo) developed by 
Roman jurists and subsequently adopted by the church. Also, patristic writings emphasized 
conformity to reason (ratio) and truth (veritas) as an essential prerequisite for the validity of a 
given consuetudo. According to Kroeschell, early medieval sources sharply distinguished 
between ius, lex, and consuetudo with their vernacular counterparts, but this distinction was 
increasingly blurred in the later Middle Ages under the influence of the canonical doctrine 
that considered consuetudo as the basis of all human law. As a result of this development, the 
traditional characteristics of consuetudo could be applied to law in general. By way of 
conclusion Kroeschell remarked that scholars would do well to abandon the “assumption of a 
continuous Germanic / German notion of the ‘good old law’.”44 
In a subsequent study Kroeschell addressed the question whether the law or a judicial 
decision in a particular case had been thought of as something pre-existing which those who 
sat in judgement were “discovering”, in accord with Kern’s conception. Kroeschell 
demonstrated that the phraseology of “finding” in relation to court sentences had been popular 
in some regions and completely absent from others. Further, he gave good reasons to believe 
that there was no question of Germanic continuity, and, in actuality, this usage could not have 
                                                 
42 von See, Altnordische Rechtswörter, pp. 92–96, 252. 
43 Kroeschell, “Recht und Rechtsbegriff,” p. 322, 326. On ēwa see also R. Schimdt-Wiegand, “Ēwa,” in RGA 8 
(1994) 35–37. 
44 Kroeschell, “Recht und Rechtsbegriff,” pp. 323–25, 331, 333–35. 
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originated before the ninth century at the earliest. As for “discovery” of the law as such, 
Kroeschell argued that it was merely a figment of Kern and other scholars’ imagination.45 
Criticism of the conception of the “good old law” reached its peak in Gerhard Köbler’s 
study of “origin and content of early medieval legal concepts in the German-speaking area” 
published in 1971.46 Like von See and Kroeschell, he focused his attention on the terminology 
of the sources, but his project was considerably more ambitious as he tried to achieve 
statistically accurate results by meticulous registration of all occurrences of the key terms in 
the legal and documentary texts from the sixth to the eleventh century.47 His main concern lay 
in disclosing Germanic legal notions, which as he believed, could be approached not so much 
on the basis of explicit statements in the sources as through a comparison between word-
usage of late antique and early medieval texts, on the one hand, and between Latin and 
vernacular terms, on the other.48 
In Köbler’s opinion, there was nothing particularly Germanic about the idea of the “good 
old law”.49 Constitutions of Roman emperors referred to ancient laws and customs markedly 
more often than medieval sources. The age of a particular legal arrangement was occasionally 
mentioned in medieval texts, especially in the case of a custom (consuetudo), and this 
characteristic probably had been of some importance in the illiterate society of the early 
Middle Ages, but in Köbler’s view, there was no indication that age had possessed a general 
constitutive significance. The idea that old law always and radically broke new lacked support 
in the sources.50 The goodness was sometimes emphasized in relation to customs, but only 
very seldom in the case of laws and rights. Köbler observed that such appraisals were more 
frequent in medieval than in antique sources presumably because of the growing influence of 
the church. In any event, he insisted, there was no justification for Kern’s thesis that goodness 
had been a sine qua non of medieval law.51 He found no indication either of the idea that law 
was immutable, and remarked that Germanic kings had been making good use of late antique 
legislative techniques, seemingly unimpeded by such notions; when the flow of enacted law 
dried up later, it was a consequence of the general decline of administrative machinery and of 
                                                 
45 Karl Kroeschell, “‘Rechtsfindung’: Die mittelalterlichen Grundlagen einer modernen Vorstellung,” in 
Festschrift für Hermann Heimpel zum 70. Geburtstag, 3 vols., Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Institut für 
Geschichte, vol. 36 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971) 3: 498–517. 
46 The subtitle of Köbler’s Das Recht im frühen Mittelalter. 
47 For Köbler’s views about the force of statistics see his Das Recht im frühen Mittelalter, pp. 3, 29 n. 122, 225. 
48 Köbler, Das Recht im frühen Mittelalter, p. 22. 
49 Köbler, Das Recht im frühen Mittelalter, pp. 221, 223; also pointed out by von See, Altnordische 
Rechtswörter, pp. 74–77. 
50 Köbler, Das Recht im frühen Mittelalter, pp. 221, 222–24, 225, 227–28. 
51 Köbler, Das Recht im frühen Mittelalter, pp. 221, 222, 224–25, 228. 
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the low level of literacy rather than the impact of the contemporary ideas of law.52 The topoi 
of “restoration”, “emendation”, and “renovation” of laws were equally or even more 
characteristic of late antique constitutions and canons than of early medieval sources.53 In 
Köbler’s view, the assumption that the Middle Ages conceived of law as something that 
resided in the common conscience of the people was questionable.54 On the whole, as Köbler 
argued, early medieval legal notions were much closer to those of late antique, or the so-
called vulgar Roman, law than it had usually been assumed.55 
Predictably, the criticism voiced by von See, Kroeschell, and Köbler encountered 
somewhat equivocal reactions. In a review of von See’s book Anne Holtsmark welcomed the 
author’s “unsentimental” approach aiming at a “deromanticization” of the received picture of 
medieval Scandinavian law and legal language but confessed that, to her, much in the book 
raised strong protest,56 and that was probably a feeling many other readers shared. However, it 
is remarkable that none of the legal historians who worked with medieval Scandinavian 
material at that moment openly took a stand on von See’s conclusions.57 Only the historian of 
religions Otto Höffler, one of those representatives of the older generation whose views von 
See wished to demolish, furiously fell on the author to whom “nothing was holy,” but that 
was only a recapitulation of the positions of the traditional Germanist doctrine, and their 
debate did not directly concern the issue of the “good old law”.58 
The reaction on Köbler’s study was different. This time it was scholars with intellectual 
and ideological orientations very remote from the Germanicism of the interwar period who 
raised strong objections to the approach taken by the author. In a circumstantial review of the 
book Gerhard Dilcher voiced criticism of Köbler’s quantifying method and pointed to the lack 
of attention on his part to such questions as educational and social background of the drafters 
of the documents, conventions of various genres with their models and a repertoire of topoi, 
and possible links between the changing meaning of legal terms and the developments in legal 
practice. Dilcher threw into question the author’s assumptions that there had existed in the 
Early Middle Ages a “Germanic idea of law” and its rival, an “antique Christian idea of law”, 
                                                 
52 Köbler, Das Recht im frühen Mittelalter, pp. 222, 224. 
53 Köbler, Das Recht im frühen Mittelalter, pp. 222, 224. 
54 Köbler, Das Recht im frühen Mittelalter, p. 225. 
55 Köbler, Das Recht im frühen Mittelalter, pp. 203, 212, 221, 228–30. 
56 Anne Holtsmark, review of von See, Altnordische Rechtswörter, in Maal og Minne (1965) 85–88. 
57 See the reviews of the book listed in Idee, Gestalt, Geschichte: Festschrift Klaus von See, Studien zur 
europäischen Kulturtradition, ed. Gerd Wolfgang Weber (Odense: Odense University Press, 1988), p. 714. 
58 See Otto Höffler, “‘Sakraltheorie’ und ‘Profantheorie’ in der Altertumskunde,” in Festschrift für Siegfried 
Gutenbrunner zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Oskar Bandle et al. (Heidelberg: Winter, 1972), pp. 71–116, and von 
See’s reply in his Kontinuitätstheorie und Sakraltheorie in der Germanenforschung: Antwort an Otto Höfler 
(Frankfurt a/M.: Athenäum, 1972). 
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and that the extant sources embodied mentality that could be characterized, on the basis of 
word-usage, as representing one of these ideas. Instead, he suggested that one should 
differentiate between a) reminisces of Antiquity in the writings of educated clergy that had 
nothing to with realities of contemporary law and society; b) attempts to use the appropriated 
antique concepts in thinking about one’s own law and society (attempts apparent, for 
example, in vernacular glosses of Latin terms that played a major role in Köbler’s study); and 
c) the predominantly oral legal culture of aristocrats and rustici, influenced only in a small 
measure by patterns of the learned thought. In Dilcher’s opinion, there was little hope of 
gaining insight into this oral culture through a lexicological study of abstract concepts of ius, 
lex, or consuetudo. As far as appraisal of Kern’s hypothesis was concerned, Dilcher agreed 
that the qualities of age and goodness had scarcely been indispensable for law in medieval 
perception but stressed that nevertheless the legal culture of the early Middle Ages had been 
thoroughly traditional and that it was inconceivable that the church should have failed to get 
across some of her ideas of the good and the right already at that time. All in all, as he 
underlined, the clear-cut and harmonious picture of medieval law that Kern had painted could 
no longer be sustained in that form and needed further critical reconsideration.59 
A number of other scholars tried to defend Kern’s conception against the wave of 
criticism. Winfried Trusen (1972) insisted that too little heed had been paid to the difference 
between actually existent laws and the ideal of law, and this ideal, influenced as it was by 
Christian thought, grounded terrestrial law in divine will and presupposed that the laws should 
embody norms of justice existing from eternity. In Trusen’s opinion, the quality of being 
“good” in this sense had a constitutive significance for medieval law in general, while the age 
was attached importance only in some spheres of legal life.60 Hanna Vollrath (1982) argued 
that in the oral and highly traditional culture of the Middle Ages customary law had been 
thought of as intrinsically good and old, but it was only when it had been described from a 
viewpoint lying outside this popular culture that it had become necessary to explicate its 
goodness and age. However, she did not present any concrete evidence in support of her 
rather speculative argument.61 More recently, Gerhard Dilcher (1992) returned to the question 
and emphasized that Kern’s “Recht und Verfassung” still retained its relevance for the study 
                                                 
59 ZRG GA 90 (1973) 267–73. 
60 Winfried Trusen, “Gutes altes Recht und consuetudo: Aus den Anfängen der Rechtsquellenlehre im 
Mittelalter,” in Recht und Staat: Festschrift für Günther Küchenhoff zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Hans Hablitzel and 
Michael Wollenschläger (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1972), pp. 189–204. Cf. also Dilcher, “Mittelalterliche 
Rechtsgewohnheit,” pp. 35–36. 
61 Hanna Vollrath, “Herrschaft und Genossenschaft im Kontext frümittelalterlicher Rechtsbeziehungen,” 
Historisches Jahrbuch 102 (1982) 51–60. 
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of medieval law inasmuch as it advocated an approach to the subject based on recognition of 
its profound alterity. In Dilcher’s opinion, Kern’s approach had much in common with the 
present-day historical anthropology.62 
There is still no consensus among German medievalists on the question of the “good old 
law”.63 Over eighty odd years attempts have been made to adapt Kern’s ideas to changing 
conceptions and concerns of succeeding generations of scholars. Also, the criticism that has 
been raised seems to have been directed not so much against the original formulation of this 
theory as against its various adaptations.64 Hence, von See, Kroeschell, and Köbler were more 
concerned with showing that the “good old law” could not have been an indigenous Germanic 
concept – an idea that Kern himself had never voiced – than with seriously addressing the 
question actually posed by Kern as to what made early medieval laws legitimate and binding 
in the understanding of the contemporaries. However, it is impossible to agree with those 
proponents of Kern’s thesis who maintain that the criticism has not affected the validity of his 
conception, aside from the ultimately inessential question of its Germanic or Christian origins. 
Critical examination of the sources, both continental and Scandinavian, has demonstrated that 
many of Kern’s inferences were founded on unwarranted generalization whereas some others 
simply lacked all support in the material. 
So far we have been concerned with the debate about the medieval “good old law” in 
German-speaking historiography. However, after an English translation of Gottesgnadentum 
und Widerstandsrecht and “Recht und Vervassung” was published in 1939, Fritz Kern’s 
theories became disseminated among much wider circles of medievalists, and it is necessary 
now to take a brief overview of the main trends of the discussion concerning the validity of 
these theories in anglophone scholarship before we go on to examine the widely opposing 
viewpoints on the issue in contemporary Norwegian historiography. 
Introducing the book and its author to the reader, the translator, S. B. Chrimes, remarked 
that Kern’s works were particularly valuable to students of English constitutional history on 
account of their method: 
[Kern] produces his results by working in the border-lands between what the Germans call 
Geistesgeschichte or the History of Weltanschauung … and Legal (Constitutional) History … 
By studying political ideas in close relation to actualities and as understood by practical men 
and the people at large, he avoids the unfortunate abstraction and academic character which 
pervades almost all Histories of mediaeval Political Thought. Here we find the assumptions and 
                                                 
62 Dilcher, “Mittelalterliche Rechtsgewohnheit,” pp. 36–37, 43–44, 59. 
63 Liebrecht, “Das gute alte Recht in der rechtshistorischen Kritikk,” pp. 187–88, 199–204. 
64 Cf. Liebrecht, “Das gute alte Recht in der rechtshistorischen Kritik,” p. 203. 
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ideas not of philosophers and scholastics, but of the men who governed and were governed – 
notions of far greater importance to all students … than learned systems of political doctrine.65 
Chrimes’ remarks shed light over the intellectual orientation prevailing in medieval studies in 
Britain and the USA at that time, the orientation which was not particularly favourable for an 
adequate understanding of the approach taken by Kern in his studies. As we have seen, 
questions that were raised in Gottesgnadentum und Widerstandsrecht and “Recht und 
Vervassung” were also discussed in early-twentieth-century anglophone scholarship, although 
with an essential difference of perspective. Remarkably, the British and American historians 
who developed views on medieval law resembling Kern’s “good old law” were all just those 
students of political thought whom Chrimes was rebuking for the “unfortunate abstraction” of 
their outlook. It seems that the works of the Carlyle brothers and McIlwain not only to an 
extent prepared the soil for a warm reception of Kern’s conception by some contemporary 
British and American medievalists but also influenced the way that many of Kern’s 
anglophone critics approached the issue. 
The intellectual agenda of many among them was a quest for the “medieval origins of the 
modern state”, to cite the programmatic title of Joseph Strayer’s book.66 Their efforts were 
directed, among other things, to demonstrating that twelfth- and thirteenth-century 
jurisprudence had developed intricate theories of legislation, sovereignty, and state and that 
these theories had made a profound impact on contemporary techniques of government. To 
these scholars, Kern’s sweeping remark that the Middle Ages had known “no genuine 
legislation by the State”67 did not seem anything more than a “paradox brilliantly sustained”.68 
They failed to see that Kern’s argument mostly concerned the earlier Middle Ages, a point 
which the author himself had not perhaps made explicit enough, but which was rightly 
emphasized in the translator’s introduction.69 Also, their objections missed another significant 
feature of Kern’s approach to medieval law, namely his focus on popular belief rather than on 
learned jurisprudence of which, no doubt, he had been well aware. It seems that Kern’s 
American critics took him for just another student of political thought in the conventional 
sense, like the Carlyle brothers or McIlwain, even though in actuality the German scholar’s 
agenda differed a lot from theirs. Therefore, when Kern’s critics occasionally attempted to 
refute his argument also as far as the earlier Middle Ages were concerned, they cited passages 
                                                 
65 S. B. Chrimes, “Introduction,” in Kern, Kinship and Law, pp. xvi–xvii. 
66 Cf. Paul Freedman and Gabriel M. Spiegel, “Medievalisms Old and New: The Rediscovery of Alterity in 
North American Medieval Studies,” American Historical Review 103 (1998) 686–90. 
67 Kern, Kinship and Law, p. 184. 
68 T. F. T. Plucknett, Legislation of Edward I (Oxford: Clarendon, 1949), p. 6 n. 
69 Chrimes, “Introduction,” in Kern, Kinship and Law, pp. xxvii–xxviii. 
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from Isidore of Seville or the Lex Romana Visigothorum not troubling themselves with the 
question about whether evidence of that sort reflected the understanding of law among the 
people at large.70 As the outcome of that criticism, a broad consensus among anglophone 
medievalists and legal historians has crystallized to the effect that Kern’s thesis is largely 
valid, but only as far as the Early Middle Ages are concerned. That there has been a heated 
debate in post-war German scholarship over the validity of the “good old law” concept in 
relation to that epoch exactly, has remained virtually unnoticed. 
The scene of Scandinavian, and particularly Norwegian, historiography, to which we turn 
now, has been by far less tranquil. The impact of Kern’s ideas became visible here only by the 
late 60s – early 70s.71 Before long, the Norwegian scholar Kåre Lunden published a popular 
survey of medieval history in which an extensive use was made of the conception of the 
“good old law” (1976). Lunden argued that Norwegian society in the High Middle Ages had 
been unfamiliar with the idea of legislative sovereignty and that there had not existed any 
institutionalized forms of establishing new laws of indubitable validity. The law had been 
thought of as essentially immutable despite the fact that, from the perspective of the modern 
historian, there had actually been a lot of legal change at that time.72 However, he only gave 
very few specific examples of this outlook in Norwegian medieval sources, a fact that was 
immediately pointed out by his critics. 
Reviewing Lunden’s book, Knut Helle took a strong objection to the author’s unreserved 
enthusiasm for Kern’s conception, “somewhat outdated”, in his view. He indicated, with a 
reference to the works of Sten Gagnér and Hermann Krause, that it had been demonstrated 
that a veritable “legislative ideology” had developed in Europe in the course of the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries, and suggested that the Norwegian monarchy’s legislative ambitions, 
evident from the 1260s onwards, had been but a local manifestation of this general trend. 
Also, Helle reminded of Klaus von See’s argument and suggested that the idea of the “good 
old law”, introduced into Scandinavia under ecclesiastical influence, had been utilized as a 
camouflage for real and conscious legislation.73 
                                                 
70 For example, see William E. Brynteson, “Roman Law and Legislation in the Middle Ages,” Speculum 41 
(1966) 422–26. 
71 See the references to Kern and the “good old law” in Sigurður Líndal, “Sendiför Ulfljóts, Ásamt nokkrum 
athugasemdum um landnám Ingólfs Arnarson,” Skírnir 143 (1969) 6–7; Ole Fenger, Fejde og mandebod, Studier 
over slægtsansvaret i germansk og gammeldansk ret (Copenhagen: Juristforbundet, 1971), pp. 34, 36; Ole J. 
Benedictow, “Konge, hird og retterboten av 17. juni 1308,” HT 51 (1972) 243–44. 
72 Kåre Lunden, Norge under Sverreætten 1177–1319¸ Norges historie, ed. Knut Mykland, vol. 3 (Olso: 
Cappelen, 1976), pp. 25–27, 30–32, 389–95, 410. 
73 Knut Helle, “Nye og gamle synspunkter på det norske middelaldersamfunnet,” Heimen 17 (1976–78) 517–18. 
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That was only the beginning of a long and heated debate, which has gradually involved 
many other Norwegian medievalists. Kern’s original thesis has quickly and tacitly been 
reduced to the question about whether or not legal changes that were actually taking place in 
medieval Norway were perceived as such by the contemporaries. Lunden has adamantly 
sustained his view that legislative sovereignty can only be attributed to the modern state and 
that the understanding of law as something essentially unchangeable (which he identifies with 
the natural-law thinking) dominated in the medieval, or – in his own terms – feudal, society.74 
For his part, Helle has conceded that fully developed legislative sovereignty is only 
characteristic of the modern state, but sprouts of this ideology, which he and Lunden identify 
with legal positivism,75 were already present in thirteenth-century Norway as elsewhere; in 
other words, Norwegian kings of that time legislated in a meaningful sense of the term. 
Moreover, from the earliest epoch the medieval Norwegians had been totally comfortable 
with the idea of a deliberate legal change, and the “good old law” language, imported by the 
church around the end of the twelfth century, was just a means for the monarchy to transfer 
the power to make laws from the popular assemblies to their own hands.76 
At the outset, the debate over Kern’s thesis was conducted in very abstract terms, even 
though Helle already at that moment proposed that the relevant source material should be re-
examined as far as possible from the perspective of the attitudes towards law and legal 
change.77 However, the first attempt at such an investigation was not taken before the mid-
80s. At that time the historian Edwin Torkelsen in collaboration with Grethe Authén Blom 
                                                 
74 Kåre Lunden, “Hovudsynspunkt på mellomaldersamfunnet,” Heimen 18 (1979–81) 50–51; “Norsk 
tronfylgjerett i seinmellomalderen og lovgjevningssuvereniteten,” Historisk Tidsskrift 65 (1986) 393, 410–19; 
“Rettspositivisme, positiv rett og suksesjonsrett i mellomalderen,” Historisk Tidsskrift 67 (1988) 29–44; “Rett og 
realitet: Rettsreglane i norsk mellomalder, på ein kulturell og sosial bakgrunn,” Forum mediaevale (1998:1) 1–
51; “Rett skal vere rett?” Forum mediaevale (1999:1–2) 43–47. 
75 More precisely, Helle uses the term “lovgivningspositivism” to denote an early stage in this development 
assuming that this meaning is inherent in the German term “Gesetzpositivismus” as opposed to 
“Rechtspositivismus”, the fully developed legal positivism, see his “Lov og rett i middelalderen – et tilsvar til 
Kåre Lunden,” Forum mediaevale (1998:2) 2. On this, Lunden, “Rett skal vere rett?” p. 43 n. 1, reacts: “Poenget 
med ‘rettspositivism’ er at retten er menneskeverk – som ikkje alle er samde i. Men “lova” som vedtekne reglar, 
må nødvendigvis etter alle si oppfatning vere meneskeverk (anten lova skaper ny rett eller ikkje). Alle er for så 
vidt nødvendigvis ‘lovgjevningspositivistar’.” However, in German scholarship the term “Gesetzpositivismus” is 
either used as a synonym of “Rechtspositivismus” or applied to the extreme version of legal positivism that 
prevailed in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, see E. Kaufmann, “Rechtspositivismus,” in HRG 
4 (1990) 321–22. 
76 Knut Helle, “Litt mer om det norske middelaldersamfunnet: Tilsvar til Kåre Lunden,” Heimen 18 (1979–81) 
86–87; “Rettsoppfatninger og rettsendringer: Europa og Norge i middelalderen,” in Festskrift til Historisk 
institutts 40-årsjubileum 1997, ed. Geir Atle Ersland et al., Historisk institutt, Universitetet i Bergen, Skrifter, 
vol. 2 (Bergen: Historisk institutt, Universitetet i Bergen, 1997), pp. 41–70; “Lov og rett i middelalderen – et 
tilsvar til Kåre Lunden,” Forum mediaevale (1998:2) 1–6; “Lov og rett i middelalderen,” in Norm og praksis i 
middelaldersamfunnet, ed. Else Mundal and Ingvild Øye, Kulturtekster, vol. 14 (Bergen: Senter for europeiske 
kulturstudier, 1999), pp. 7–22; “På stedet marsj,” Forum mediaevale (1999:1–2) 49–51. 
77 Helle, “Litt mer om det norske middelaldersamfunnet,” p. 87; cf. Lunden, “Norsk tronfylgjerett,” p. 418–19. 
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published a paper about the validity of the law of royal succession from 1163~64. There he 
argued that in twelfth-century Icelandic and Norwegian sources there was no indication of the 
idea that the law was considered as immutable. On the contrary, the law served practical 
interests, with the corollary that legal provisions could be promulgated, abrogated, or altered 
if needed.78 Further, Torkelsen insisted that changes in the laws were subject to a formalized 
procedure, which was intended to secure consent of the parties concerned and ensure 
notoriety of the decision. In his opinion, conformity to this procedure made the new law valid, 
and from this moment it overruled any previous arrangements that were at variance with it.79 
Torkelsen’s understanding of validity occasioned critical comments of Per Norseng 
(1987). As he pointed out, the simple fact that those who formulated new legal provisions 
insisted on their validity should not be confused with the question about how binding these 
provisions were to the public conscience.80 Norseng suggested that Kern’s model of medieval 
law accounted well for certain peculiarities of the legal and political life in medieval Norway, 
which were hardly explicable from the perspective of Torkelsen’s notion of validity based on 
formal criteria: “Legal innovations were not tantamount to setting aside older contradicting 
law… Theoretically, older regulations could be mobilized as legal sources in conflicts as long 
as there existed people who did not accept the last formulated legal rules.”81 As an example of 
such a way of thinking, Norseng pointed out Sverrir’s line of argument in his conflict first 
with Magnús Erlingsson and then with the church. In Norseng’s opinion, twelfth- and 
thirteenth-century Norway was generally characterized by an “unclarified relationship 
between various legal sources and between old and new law.”82 
Of late, Knut Helle has called attention to the image of King Óláfr Haraldsson as 
legislator that make an appearance in many medieval sources.83 In Helle’s opinion, this image 
had been gradually developing over a long time span under the influence of Óláfr’s growing 
fame as a saint, but it was only in the latter half of the twelfth century, in the life of the saint 
king written by Archbishop Eysteinn, that the tendency first materialized to identify the “laws 
of St Óláfr” with eternal higher law. In this connection Helle points to the words of Passio 
Olavi describing the laws established by the saint king as “divinas et humanas” and interprets 
the term “divinae leges” as “divine laws” having the character of natural law and hence 
                                                 
78 Edwin Torkelsen and Grethe Authén Blom, “Fra gammel rett til ny lov: Noen problemer knyttet til nymælers 
‘gyldighet’,” HT 63 (1984) 248–53. 
79 Torkelsen and Blom, “Fra gammel rett til ny lov,” pp. 253–56, 263–64. 
80 Per Norseng, “Gammel rett, ny lov – et fett?” HT 66 (1987) 67, 75, 79, 80–81. 
81 Norseng, “Gammel rett,” pp. 66–67. 
82 Norseng, “Gammel rett,” p. 81. 
83 Helle, “Rettsoppfatninger og rettsendringer,” pp. 55, 57–67. 
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inviolable, while “humanae leges”, according to Helle, should be construed as customary 
law.84 (The fact that “divinus” as opposed to “humanus” can in medieval Latin usage simply 
mean “pertaining to things sacred” or “ecclesiastical” and that “divine law” was commonly 
understood by medieval authors as the divine will expressed in the Scripture has evidently 
escaped the scholar’s notice85). Finally, by the end of King Hákon Hákonarson’s reign, the 
“laws of St Óláfr” begin to represent some sort of “divine natural law” that Hákon purported 
to “restore” to his subjects in order to free himself from the shackles of the positive law.86 
In a recent article (2001) Sverre Bagge approaches the question how medieval 
Scandinavian audiences understood the law from the point of view of judicial process. As 
point of departure, he takes the saga story about King Sigurðr Jórsalafari’s suit against Sigurðr 
Hranason. In Bagge’s opinion, this story indicates that, in the contemporary conception, the 
law could be changed. Moreover, it was easily adapted to changing conditions and was 
largely created ad hoc in concrete situations. On the other hand, he finds traces of the notion 
that the judges at the assembly were to “find” the law in a way broadly resembling the idea of 
the “good old law”. According to Bagge, the paradox consists in the fact that, to the saga 
author, there was not much difference between “making” and “finding” the law.87 
In the previous paragraphs we have given an outline of major currents in the ongoing 
discussion about attitudes towards law that characterized medieval society. This survey gives 
an occasion for some general remarks concerning approaches to the legal situation in twelfth- 
and thirteenth-century Norway from this perspective. As one modern commentator remarked, 
“whenever we have a complex question that has been answered Yes or No, we may suspect 
that something has been left out in the process.” This seems to be the case with the Norwegian 
debate over the “good old law”, too. As we have seen, Fritz Kern inquired in his “Recht und 
Verfassung” what gave medieval law a binding force and concluded that at that time law was 
grounded in its age and goodness. Whether or not that was the legacy of some pre-medieval 
Germanic legal culture, was of marginal interest to him, and is, in our opinion, quite irrelevant 
for understanding of the actualities of high medieval Norway. It is more important for our 
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purposes to notice that Kern’s argument tacitly left out of the discussion the possibility that in 
the Middle Ages legal arrangements could in different cases derive their validity from various 
sources. This multiplicity of legal forms has been convincingly demonstrated in the studies of 
Wilhelm Ebel and other scholars.88 Certainly, Ebel’s categories of Weistum, Satzung, and 
Rechtsgebot, based as they are on the evidence of medieval Germany, cannot be 
straightforwardly applied to the Norwegian material, and it is hard to tell just how dissimilar 
the situation was here and there before a close examination of the sources is carried out from 
this angle, but at the very outset it seems likely that legal life in medieval Norway was no less 
rich in forms of creating bindingness. Some provisions in Norwegian provincial collections of 
laws explicitly refer to an agreement made at the assembly between the people and the king 
and / or the bishop, or between the farmers themselves.89 In other cases the legal force of a 
provision of law is grounded in the oath given by the thingmen or the guildsmen.90 In all these 
and some other instances, the age of the law could hardly have been of any significance for its 
validity, and such goodness as may have been ascribed to it was, obviously, of a nature quite 
distinct from that envisaged by Kern: in his conception, a given legal norm is good, because it 
has been so from eternity, with the corollary that anything else would inevitably be a 
departure from justice; in a Norwegian legal text, however, the farmers envision a possibility 
of coming to an agreement on some different terms. All in all, it seems that no notion of 
legislative sovereignty was necessary in order that laws could, at least in some situations, 
dispense with the two qualities that Kern indiscriminately attributed to all medieval law. 
Sweeping generalization that is not infrequently apparent in Kern’s approach probably 
constitutes its greatest, although not sole, weakness. This tendency to discuss medieval law in 
exceedingly broad terms, to draw inferences about the whole from an analysis of a particular 
clause of a law-book, and this when the meaning of the text is often not immediately 
transparent, has been typical of the Norwegian debate, too. It has become clear in the course 
of this debate that there are in fact not so many sources from the period under consideration in 
which a noticeable emphasis is laid on the age of a given legal rule or personal right. Instead 
of explaining away or boldly extrapolating this evidence, it would perhaps be more fruitful to 
closer examine these sources in their ideological and social setting. There is no doubt that 
Kern did not just conjure up the “good old law” out of thin air. Regardless of whether or not 
the medieval Norwegians could envision a deliberate legal change and lawmaking, regardless 
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of the grave doubts that we may have as to many of Kern’s assumptions about medieval law, 
it still remains an observable fact that the good law of the past was indeed invoked on a 
variety of occasions in medieval Norway as elsewhere. The important question is which 
particular circumstances made this possible and expedient. 
It is necessary to delineate more precisely the spheres of social and political life in which 
an opportunity presented itself to appeal to the good law of the past. As we have seen, Per 
Norseng has pointed out one such sphere: in a conflict over rights one of the parties could 
sometimes ground their claim in legal norms which the other party considered superseded. 
Norseng’s argument seems very convincing as far as we assume that disputes and the business 
of settling them centred on questions of law in the sense of substantive principles. This was 
apparently true in the instances he has mentioned: conflicts over succession to the throne or 
tariffs of penalties in the archbishop’s suits (we will have a closer look at these examples 
further in our study). But was it characteristic of legal life in twelfth-century Norway on the 
whole? Much research into the process of dispute-settlement needs to be done before we can 
answer this question with some degree of certainty. As yet, we can only hypothetically 
suppose that the workings of this process bore a broad similarity to what was going on in 
other medieval communities, which have long since become an object of study from this 
perspective. Among other things, it appears that, previous to the emergence of a developed 
system of royal justice in the late twelfth and the thirteenth century, litigation procedure in the 
lay courts of Europe gave little room for an appeal to, and application of, substantive rules of 
law.91 This observation not only renders doubtful Kern’s theory of “judgement-finding” but 
also suggests that Norseng’s model of conflict involving recourse to the good law of the past 
should not be overly generalized. 
In the following discussion of the history of the notion of the “laws of St Óláfr” we will 
make an attempt to disclose some other areas of legal life where the need to stress the age of a 
law or right could sometimes arise.  
 
                                                 
91 See particularly Fredric L. Cheyette, “Custom, Case Law, and Medieval ‘Constitutionalism’: A Re-
Examination,” Political Science Quarterly 78 (1963) 366–71, and “Suum cuique tribuere,” French Historical 
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CHAPTER   2 
In Search of the Origins 
 
 
 
 
King Óláfr Haraldsson’s reputation of legislator: the case of scald Sighvatr 
 
When did the notion of the “laws of St Óláfr” originate? At first glance the question may 
seem odd. Indeed, there is a broad consensus among scholars that Óláfr Haraldsson’s reign 
was a time of profound changes in Norwegian legal life. The introduction of Christianity was, 
after all, also a matter of the law. It is inconceivable that the king, who put so much effort into 
establishing the new religion, should have played no part in the wide-ranging lawmaking 
which regulation of various issues of Christian observance, ecclesiastical organisation, and 
relations between the church and the lay society presumably entailed. Therefore, it would 
seem reasonable to assume, with Grethe Authén Blom and Knut Helle, that Óláfr’s well-
established reputation of a legislator among his contemporaries provided a natural point of 
departure for the development of a legendary tradition about the laws that the saint king gave 
to his subjects, a tradition which increasingly fictionalised the historical fact lying in its 
foundation.92 
Finding out the facts is, however, a tricky task in this case. The evidence of the sagas on 
this point has been taken with a great deal of scepticism ever since Konrad Maurer who 
pointed out that saga writers had been strongly influenced, on the one hand, by the clichés of 
the hagiographical legend and, on the other, by Norwegian political realities of their own day 
when the “laws of St Óláfr” had frequently been invoked as the grand safeguard of traditional 
rights and liberties.93 Also, it is exceedingly difficult to sift out those legal provisions which 
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 30
date back to Óláfr’s time from later material in the extant books of laws. It is only in the 
Christian Laws Section of Gulaþingsbók that we find provisions explicitly attributed to his 
epoch. Their number is small, and their content is of a very specific nature. The clauses in 
question say that at the initiative of King Óláfr and Bishop Grímkell it was stipulated at an 
assembly on Moster Isle that Christian religion is to be kept, that Sundays and a number of 
mass-days are to be honoured, that the bishop is to govern the churches as far as appointment 
and ordination of priests is concerned, and that men in each district (fylki) are to maintain the 
“head church” (höfuðkyrkja) there and provide for the priests’ livelihood.94 This does not 
amount to very much in comparison with the all-embracing notion of the “laws of St Óláfr” as 
we find it in late-twelfth- and thirteenth century sources. But maybe the king’s role in 
enacting these and similar provisions could nevertheless provide a sufficient base for his 
renown as a lawgiver in the eyes of his contemporaries? Answering this question in the 
affirmative, Blom and Helle cite two eleventh-century stanzas by the scald Sighvatr 
Þórðarson, Óláfr’s court poet and friend. 
In one of them Sighvatr says: 
loftbyggvir, mátt leggja 
lands rétt þanns skal standask, 
unnar, allra manna, 
eykja, liðs í miðli.95 
“The stern-dweller of the horse of the wave [horse of wave = ship; stern-dweller of ship = 
warrior]! you are capable of establishing lands réttr amongst all men which will prevail.” 
We do not know if this fragment preserved only in Snorri’s Óláfs saga ins helga was 
originally a lausavísa or formed a part of a longer poem, nor when, and under which 
circumstances, it was composed.96 The wording of the stanza seems transparent enough, and it 
is only the expression lands réttr (or landréttr, as in some manuscripts) that present some 
difficulty for interpretation. The term is a hapax in the corpus of scaldic poetry, and in the 
provincial books of laws it does not occur either, while in thirteenth-century saga prose, in 
Snorri and elsewhere, the word is common and nearly always used there as the member 
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otiosus in the alliterating pair lög ok landsrétt, which simply means ‘laws of the land’.97 It is 
only natural then that Snorri takes the scald’s utterance for an acclamation of the king’s 
lawgiving: “you can lay down law” and uses it in order to support his own detailed report of 
Óláfr’s legislation (below we shall have a look at this report, which is interesting in its own 
right). 
Whether this was what Sighvatr was actually saying is, however, far from clear. As Klaus 
von See has convincingly shown, the Old Norse réttr initially had a spectre of meanings that 
centred on the idea of a legal, justifiable title or claim to something, a personal right, whereas 
the meaning of a “system of objective legal norms” was covered by the term lög. This 
distinction got increasingly blurred with the course of time, but even then expressions such as 
guðs réttr in reference to the system of norms for which the Church claimed validity apart 
from, and above, secular laws and customs still retained a vestige of the original contrast to 
the sense of lög.98 Also, in all instances when réttr occurs in pre-thirteenth-century scaldic 
verse, it has the meaning of a “claim to something”, as in the verse by Sighvatr’s 
contemporary, Þórmóðr Kolbrúnarskáld, who speaks of his right to receive gold from the king 
in reward of his poetry,99 or that of “rights, privileges”, which the king can give to the people 
of a region (cf. réttarbót), as in the case of King Magnús berrfœtr and the Upplanders: “He 
gave men those privileges (rétt) which the prudent farmers were to repay with loyalty”;100 but 
there are no examples of the use of réttr in the sense of “objective legal order”. It would seem 
unwarranted therefore to assume that the terms lög and lands réttr had been as easily 
interchangeable for Sighvatr as they were for Snorri and to interpret the scald’s words as an 
assertion to the effect that the king was establishing a body of legal norms among his subjects. 
Although it is hardly possible to say exactly what meaning land(s)réttr had in Sighvatr’s 
verse since we do not know the setting in which this half-stanza originally stood, one should 
probably see it in the broader context of the contemporary ideal of kingship with its strong 
emphasis on the king’s role as the maintainer of order and justice in the society. Instead of 
reading the stanza as an acclamation of Óláfr’s legislative ambitions, it would perhaps be 
                                                 
97 Snorri uses the expression lög ok landsréttr many times, see Hkr (Hhárf) 6; Hkr (Hákgóð) 12 and 15; Hkr 
(Ólhelg) 58, 60, 117, 127, 137, and 181; Hkr (MErl) 12 and 21, ed. Bjarni Aðalbjarnarson 1: 98, 165, 170; 2: 74, 
77, 197, 219, 242, 328; 3: 387, 396. Outside this collocation landsréttr, also with the meaning “laws of the land” 
occurs only two times in Heimskringla, see Hkr (Ólhelg) 130 and Hkr (MErl) 21, ed. Bjarni Aðalbjarnarson 2: 
222 and 3: 396. 
98 von See, Altnordische Rechtswörter, pp. 29–30, 52–57. On directly comparably developments in the 
terminology of continental legal sources see Kroeschell, “Recht und Rechtsbegriff,” pp. 314–18. 
99 Þórmóðr Kolbrúnarskáld, lausavísa 10, in Skjd. B1: 262. 
100 Gísl Illugason, Erfikvæði um Magnús berrfœtr 7, in Skjd. B1: 410. 
 32
better-advised to understand the scald’s utterance as something like “King! you are capable of 
establishing right among all men which will prevail!” 
This ideal of king and its antithesis find a particularly forceful expression in Sighvatr’s 
Bersöglisvísur (“Outspoken” or “Unvarnished Verses”), a poem which the scald Sighvatr 
addressed to Óláfr’s son.101 The poem was occasioned by the king’s bitter conflict with the 
farmers. The scald was trying to mediate between the two parties. He spoke of the reasons 
that were leading the farmers to rise against their king: 
hafa kveðask lög nema ljúgi 
landherr búendr verri 
endr í Ulfasundum 
önnur enn þú hétsk mönnum.102 
“Unless the retainers lie, the farmers say they have worse law, different than you 
promised to the people earlier in Ulvesund.” 
To judge from other passages in Sighvatr’s poem, the “worse law” (verri lög) he was referring 
to had nothing to do with legislation as such. It was rather some general principles that 
Magnús had promised to follow in his dealings with the subjects but from which he was 
presently departing. The scald vividly described the situation in which the farmers found 
themselves as a result of that: “Who urges you to slay the stock of battle-brave men? It is folly 
for a king to do [this] in his own country… Your troops are tired of looting (rán).”103 The 
“worse law” in question was actually lawlessness.  
Sighvatr contrasted the way Magnús and his men were behaving with the ideal of kingship 
that the great rulers of the past embodied. Whereas Magnús’ men were engaged in plunder, 
his predecessor Hákon góði punished crime and maintained law in the country: 
hét sás fell á Fitjum 
fjölgegn ok réð hegna 
heiptar rán en honum 
Hákunn firar unnu 
þjóð helt fast á fóstra 
fjölblíðs lögum síðan 
enn eru af því minni 
Aðalsteins búendr seinir.104 
                                                 
101 On this poem see Finnur Jónsson, Lit. hist. 1:591–94, and most recently the stimulative discussion by 
Marianne Ustvedt, Af tungu fram: Sigvat Tordssons Bergsoglisvísur som skaldisk realisme og poetisk 
propaganda, unpubl. diss. (University of Oslo, 1997), who also provides a critical edition of the text. 
102 Skjd. 1B:236; Ustvedt, Af tungu fram, pp. 64–65, 86, 97. 
103 Skjd. 1B: 237; Ustvedt, Af tungu fram, pp. 66–67, 87–88, 97. 
104 Skjd. 1B: 235; Ustvedt, Af tungu fram, pp. 57–58, 83–84, 96. 
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“Hákon who fell at Fitjar, was called very just: he curbed hostile pillage and people loved 
him. The people have since stuck to the law of Aðalstein’s most friendly foster son; the 
farmers are still slow [to abandon] this memory.” 
By analogy with the use of the word lög in the stanza we quoted above, it would appear that 
the “law” of Hákon, whose example Magnús was urged to follow, had an equally broad 
meaning of standards of justice and lawfulness kept up by the king. There is nothing in the 
verse to suggest that the scald was referring to a particular body of legislation that had given 
Hákon his reputation of being fjölgegn “very just, fair, upright”. 
Sighvatr was carrying on with contrasts: “One matter the farmers speak about is especially 
grave: ‘my lord [King Magnús] appropriated (?) men’s ancestral farmlands (lá sín eign á óðal 
þegna)’.”105 That was not the way kings like Óláfr Tryggvason and Óláfr Haraldsson, 
Magnús’ father, acted: 
rétt hykk kjósa knáttu 
karlfolk ok svá jarla 
af því at eignum lofða 
Óláfar frið gáfu 
“I believe that both farmers and jarls chose rightly, because the [two] Óláfrs brought 
peace to people’s properties.” 
And again, the word lög, “law”, makes an appearance in the verse: 
Haralds arfi lét halda 
hvardyggr ok son Tryggva 
lög þaus lýðar þágu 
laukjöfn at þeim nöfnum.106 
“Haraldr’s always constant heir and Tryggvi’s (always constant) son upheld the most just 
law that men received from the [two] namesakes.” 
Is it the two king’s fame of legislators Sighvatr was referring to here, as most modern 
historians including Blom and Helle suppose?107 Scarcely, considering the general ideological 
agenda expressed in Bersöglisvísur and the concrete political circumstances in which the 
poem originated. The message Sighvatr was trying his best to get across was that Magnús 
could not go on setting himself above the law; he ought to pay heed to what the farmers 
wanted (hlýðið … til hvat búmenn vilja);108 he was expected to protect the peace and people’s 
properties from plunderers instead of harrying in his own country. What the scald says about 
the law that Óláfr Haraldsson gave to the people should be understood against this 
                                                 
105 Skjd. 1B: 238; Ustvedt, Af tungu fram, pp. 71–72, 92–93, 98. 
106 Skjd. 1B:235; Ustvedt, Af tungu fram, pp. 58–59, 85, 96. 
107 Blom, “St. Olavs lov,” pp. 64–65; Knut Helle, “Rettsoppfatninger og rettsendringer,” p. 58. 
108 Skjd. 1B: 237; Ustvedt, Af tungu fram, pp. 65–66, 89–91, 97. 
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background. The question of whether or not Óláfr legislated, was simply irrelevant in this 
context. 
Sighvatr was an experienced and far-travelled man. He saw the English court of King 
Knútr, the model royal court in Northern Europe of his day. He may well have been familiar 
with the idea that a good king ought to give laws to his subjects. But it is significant that when 
Sighvatr himself spoke about laws he lay emphasis not on the king’s power to create laws but 
on his duty to maintain legality and equity in the society. Everyone should be given his due: 
Lát auman nú njóta, 
Nóregs, ok gef stórum, 
(mál halt) svá sem sælan, 
sinjór, laga þinna.109 
“Signor of Norway, let the poor just like the rich now benefit from your laws, and give 
generously. Keep your word.” 
The same idea played a prominent part in the self-representation of Knútr’s monarchy, and we 
may suspect that it was an influence from these quarters that was reflected in Sighvatr’s 
words. The parallels are striking. In 1027, while on a journey to Rome, Knútr was addressing 
his subjects in a letter which contained a veritable programme of the country’s governance: 
I command also all the sheriffs and reeves over my whole kingdom, as they wish to retain my 
friendship and their own safety, that they employ no unjust force against any man, neither rich 
nor poor, but that all men, of noble or humble birth, rich or poor, shall have the right to enjoy 
just law (omnibus tam nobilibus quam ignobilibus et diuuitibus et pauperibus sit fas iusta lege 
potiundi).110 
From this point of view, it was ultimately unimportant whether a king was a legislator; what 
mattered was that he ought to use his strength in suppressing injustice and see to it that the 
laws were always respected. 
Medieval Icelandic men of letters had immense knowledge and genuine appreciation of 
verse by viking-age scalds, but to them, it was, above all, a valuable source of information 
about past events. The ideological agenda of Sighvatr’s poetry had little significance from 
their perspective. Seeking for the facts behind poetic allusions, they visualized the law the 
scald had been speaking of as codes of laws enacted by the great kings of the past. Snorri is a 
vivid example in this respect. He takes Sighvatr’s utterances for an affirmation to the effect 
                                                 
109 The addressee of this stanza, preserved only in Snorri’s Edda, is unknown. Finnur Jónsson includes it in his 
edition of Bersöglisvísur in Skjd. 1B: 238; transl. Anthony Faulkes in Snorri Sturluson, Edda (London: 
Everyman, 1987), pp. 146, 150. 
110 Cnut’s letter of 1027 12, ed. F. Liebermann in Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen 1: 277; transl. in English 
Historical Documents, vol. 1, c. 500–1042, ed. Dorothy Whitelock, 2nd ed. (London: Methuen, 1979) no. 53, 
p. 478. 
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that Hákon Aðalsteinsfóstri “laid great stress on legislation (lagasetning),” and although for 
reasons of his own Snorri does not present Óláfr Tryggvason as a legislator in his account of 
this king’s reign, he further reports that at his election to the throne Óláfr Haraldsson had 
promised to maintain the rights and laws such as his namesake had given to the farmers.111 Of 
particular interest is his report of Ólafr Haraldsson’s lawmaking activities. Snorri says: 
He had often recited in his presence the laws which Hákon Aðalsteinsfóstri had given to the 
Trondheim District. He changed laws (skipaði lögum) with the advice of the wisest men, taking 
away or adding as seemed best to him (tók af eða lagði til, þar er honum sýndisk þat). The 
Christian code of laws he gave in accordance with the advice of Bishop Grímkell and other 
priests, laying great stress on abolishing heathendom and ancient practices such as seemed to 
him contrary to the spirit of Christianity. In the end the farmers agreed to the laws the king 
gave.112 
How did Snorri get the idea that Óláfr made use of Hákon’s legislation? The fact that the two 
kings were juxtaposed in his source, Sighvatr, provides only a partial explanation. Also, he 
may have remembered what the author of Fagrskinna said about Hákon’s lawgiving: “He 
established laws over all Norway with the advice of Þorleifr spaki and other wise men, and 
King Óláfr the Saint took use of most of these laws.”113 However, the most important 
influence seems to have come from afar. Snorri’s phrase “tók af eða lagði til, þar er honum 
sýndisk þat” points to an influence of a topos of “renovation” and “emendation” of the laws 
that had a long tradition. A century before the writer of Heimskringla another Icelandic man 
of letters, Ari Þorgilsson, described in similar expressions how the first body of laws, 
Ulfljótslög, was imported to the country from Norway: 
And when Iceland had been widely settled, a Norwegian named Ulfljótr for the first time 
brought here law from Norway … and this was called Ulfljótr’s law … And this [law] was 
primarily modelled upon the Gulaþing law of that time and [adapted] on the advice of Þorleifr 
                                                 
111 See Hkr (Hákgóð) 11 and Hkr (Ólhelg) 38 and 40, ed. Bjarni Aðalbjarnarson 1: 163 and 2: 50, 51. In the last 
cited passage Snorri also mentions that Óláfr Haraldsson offered the farmers the peace (friðr) which Óláfr 
Tryggvason had offered to them before him, and this may be a reminiscence from Bersöglisvísur, too. 
112 Ólhelg (Sep) 43, ed. Johnsen and Jón Helgason, p. 104; Hkr (Ólhelg) 58, ed. Bjarni Aðalbjarnarson 3: 73; 
transl. Lee M. Hollander in Snorri Sturluson, Heimskringla, History of the Kings of Norway (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 1964), p. 289. 
113 Fagrskinna – Nóregs konunga tal 9, ed. Bjarni Einarsson, Íslenzk fornrit, vol. 29 (Rekjavik: Hið Íslenzka 
fornritafélag, 1985; hereafter Fsk), p. 80. Gustav Indrebø, Fagrskinna, Avhandlinger fra Universitetets historiske 
seminar, vol. 4 (Kristiania: Grøndahl, 1917), p. 136, suggests that the story was made up by the author of 
Fagrskinna. That Snorri introduces the account of Óláfr’s legislation at that stage of his narrative when his 
protagonist has just become the sole ruler of the country might also indicate the influence of Fsk 31, ed. Bjarni 
Einarson, p. 181. On the relationship between Fagrskinna and Heimskringla see Bjarni Aðalbjarnarson, Om de 
norske kongers sagaer, Skrifter utg. av Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademi i Oslo, II. Hist.-Filos. Kl., 1936, no. 4 
(Oslo: Dybwad, 1937), pp. 173–236. 
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spaki, the son of Hörða-Kári, as to what one should add, or subtract, or provide differently (hvar 
við skyldi auka eða af nema eða annan veg setja).114 
But the ultimate of this topos was Justinian’s Novel 7 in which the Roman emperor declared 
his intention to make a single law covering the subject, “which would renew and emend all 
previous [laws], and add what was lacking and cut away what was superfluous (quod deest 
adiciat et quod superfluum est abscidat).”115 Thus, the intellectual experience of the Icelandic 
age of learning made it possible for literate saga authors to read into Sighvatr’s verse new 
meanings and interpret it as a kind of treatise on the history of royal legislation in viking-age 
Norway. 
Retracing our steps to the question that we put at the beginning – when did the notion of 
the “laws of St Óláfr” emerge – we see that there is no reason to assume that Óláfr’s 
legislative ambitions had much prominence in his contemporaries’ image of him and that the 
memory of his legislative effort provided a natural point of departure for the subsequent 
growth of the legend. Rather the roots of this legend seem to lie in the period following 
Óláfr’s death in the battle of Stiklestad. At that time the country came under the Danish rule, 
and the new governors were determined to impose on their subjects a heavier burden of public 
service, severer penalties for violence, and new forms of taxation. The Danish regime soon 
collapsed, but its legacy, the “laws of Álfífa”, persisted, at least in some part, for another 
hundred odd years. This situation could not but prompt comparisons with the good old days, 
with the time when Óláfr, venerated now as a saint, reigned in Norway. We find such 
allusions to the “days of Óláfr” in a number of articles in Frostuþingsbók, a provincial 
collection of laws which is only preserved in its complete form in a version from 1260s, but 
much of its content dates back to earlier times. 
 
In the Days of King Óláfr the Saint, or Fish and Ideology in Frostuþingsbók 
 
The late-twelfth-century Norwegian chronicle Ágrip af Nóregskonunga sögum describes 
in some detail the new laws that the Danish rulers, King Sveinn and his mother Álfífa 
(Ælfgyfu), instituted in the country: 
                                                 
114 Íslendingabók 2, ed. Jakob Benediktsson, Íslenzk fornrit, vol. 1 (Reykjavik: Hið íslenzka fornritafélag, 1968), 
pp. 6–7. Sigurður Líndal, “Sendiför Ulfljóts, Ásamt nokkrum athugasemdum um landnám Ingólfs Arnarson,” 
Skírnir 143 (1969) 5–26, gives good reasons for supposing that the whole story was a learned construction. 
However, the relevance of the “renovation” topos has escaped his notice. 
115 Justinian, Nov. 7 pr. Further we will have an occasion to take a closer look at this motif and its development 
in medieval Norway, see below, pp. 66–67. 
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At Yule each farmer was to give the king a measure of malt for each hearth, a ham from a three-
year-old ox – this was called a ‘bit of the meadow’ (vinar toddi = vinjar toddi) – and a measure 
of butter; and each housewife should supply a ‘lady’s tow’ (rykkjartó = rýgjartó) – that was as 
much clean flax as could be clasped between thumb and middle finger. […] Each man who 
went fishing was to pay the king a ‘land bundle’ (landvarða) from wherever he put out, and this 
was five fish. […] These obligations remained until Sigurðr Jórsalafari and his brothers 
abolished most of these impositions.116 
Norwegian collections of laws also record the abolishment of a number of these duties. In 
Gulaþingsbók the provision in question is attributed to kings Magnús góði and Hákon Þóris 
fóstri Magnússon,117 but in Frostuþingsbók the corresponding ordinances figure as réttarbœtr 
given individually to the Þrœndir, the Háleygjar, and the Naumdœlir by kings Sigurðr, 
Eysteinn, and Óláfr presumably sometime before 1107.118 
Among these provisions it is the réttarbót to the people of Hålogaland which presents 
particular interest from the point of view of the prehistory of the “laws of St Óláfr”. The 
article opens with a declaration to the effect that the kings remit all taxes on fishing 
(fiskigjafir), an except being made for the fisheries in Vágar on Lofoten: those who fish there 
are to pay five fish as before.119 Other payments remitted are briefly mentioned: the “malt 
measure” (reykmælir), the “lady’s tow” (rýgjartó), and the “meadow tail” (vinjarspönn). After 
that follows a statement concerning commons, that is, all uncultivated tracts of land such as 
waste, wood, and waterfront, to which no individual can claim an exclusive right: 
Also they [King Sigurðr and his brothers] have allowed them [the Háleygjar] to have the 
commons (almenningar) as they had them in the days of Óláfr the Saint, both the outer [i.e., 
those to the sea] and the upper [commons, i.e., within the land] to the south and to the north.120 
                                                 
116 Ágrip af Nóregskonunga sögum 29, ed. Bjarni Einarsson in Íslenzk fornrit, vol. 29 (Reykjavik: Hið Íslenzka 
fornritafélag, 1985; hereafter Ágrip), pp. 28–29; transl. Matthew Driscoll in Ágrip af Nóregs konungasögum, A 
Twelfth-Century Synoptic History of the Kings of Norway, Viking Society for Northern Research, Text Series, 
vol. 10 (London: Viking Society for Northern Research, 1995), pp. 41–43. Cf. Ólhelg (Leg) 71, ed. Johnsen, 
p. 73; Hkr (Ólhelg) 239, ed. Bjarni Aðalbjarnarson 3: 399–400. On the “laws of Álfífa” see particularly Johannes 
C. H. R. Steenstrup, Normannerne, 4 vols. (Copenhagen: Klein, 1876–82) 3: 383–90; Gustav Indrebø, “Ågrip,” 
Edda 17 (1922) 43–45. 
117 G 148, ed. Keyser and Munch in NgL 1: 58–59. 
118 F 16.1–3, ed. Keyser and Munch in NgL 1: 257–58. 
119 This exception probably had a connection with the economic importance of these fisheries, but the fact that 
the kings provided the fishermen there with, so to speak, special facilities might have played a role, too, cf. 
Eysteinn Magnússon’s words in Morkinskinna, ed. Finnur Jónsson, Samfund til Udgivelse af Gammel Nordisk 
Litteratur, vol. 53 (Copenhagen: Jørgensen, 1932; hereafter Msk), p. 384: “I established a shelter for fishermen 
north in Vágar so that poor men could have aid and subsistence. I also had a church built there and established a 
parsonage.” 
120 F 16.2, ed. Keyser and Munch in NgL 1: 257–58: “Þessa réttarbót hafa konungar gefit Háleygium öllum. þat 
eru fiskigiafir allar bæði af nesium öllum oc af öllum fiskistöðum. fyrir utan þat er menn hafa gefit konungi .v. 
fisca. þat scal hverr maðr fá er í fisci er í Vágum. reycmæla oc rygiar tó oc viniar spönn. Hafa þeir oc gefit 
almenninga alla slíca sem þeir höfðu um hins helga Ólafs daga. bæði hit ytra oc hit öfra. sunnarla oc norðarla. En 
klóvöru alla fyrir norðan Umeyiarsund. þar á konungr einn caup á …”; transl. Laurence M. Larson in The 
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Although the connection between individual clauses within the article should have been 
readily understandable for the original audience, to the modern reader it may appear 
somewhat obscure. 
One might assume that the section about commons forms an individual provision, distinct 
from the abolishment of the tributes, and that the article actually contains two separate 
réttarbœtr, one remitting the payments, the other allowing the Háleygjar to use of the 
commons. In this case we face the problem of explaining just which specific claims to the 
common the kings waive and why they should do it only in respect of Hålogaland. 
We may try to approach the problem from a different angle. There seems to be a 
connection between the fact that the kings remit the five-fish tribute and the declaration that 
the Háleygjar can henceforth have their outer commons “as they had them in the days of Óláfr 
the Saint”. The “fish tribute” (fiskigjafir) remitted by the réttarbót was taken “both from all 
the headlands and from all the fishingsteads (fiskistöðvar)”. The sagas also indicate that the 
landvarða, which is apparently the same thing as the fiskigjafir, was to be paid by everyone 
who went fishing “from wherever he put out”. This formulation is not very clear but it seems 
to imply that not fishing as such but the use of places along the coast either as shelter for the 
night or for storage of the catch was liable to the tax. For the most part, such places were no 
man’s land and constituted the “outer” commons mentioned in the Frostuþingsbók article. It 
is well conceivable then that the fish tribute introduced under the Danish rule was conceived 
as an infringement on people’s right to their commons and, by implication, the remittance of 
the tribute could easily be presented as “restitution” of the “outer” commons. In this case it is 
also understandable why the question of the commons surfaces only in this article: since the 
tax on fishing is not mentioned in the neighbouring articles,121 neither are the commons. 
In fact, the clause in question specifies that both this and the other kind of the common 
were given back, namely the one comprising waste, wood, and plateau lands (hit œfra). What 
lies behind these words, is not very clear. However, we are perhaps justified in assuming that 
there is some link between this and the stipulation that follows, which reserves the king’s 
right to purchase fur. Indeed, a reservation of this kind can only conceivably be included in 
one article with a set of réttarbœtr if it corresponds directly with one of them, as the case is 
with the five fish tax on Lofoten in first section. Now the text as it stands does not expressly 
mention abolishment of any tax on (fur) hunt analogous to the five-fish tax, nor is such a tax 
                                                                                                                                                        
Earliest Norwegian Laws Being the Gulathing Law and the Frostathing Law, Records of Civilization, vol. 20 
(New York: Columbia Univiversity Press, 1935), p. 405. 
121 Apparently, because only in Hålogaland the question was of major economic significance and the tax at issue 
may never have been introduced in other places within Frostuþing jurisdiction. 
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known from other sources, but we may speculate that some arrangement giving (fur) hunt a 
freer rein was made on the occasion, to which the statement of the king’s purchase rights 
formed a counterbalancing complement and which stood for a “return” of the common. 
By abolishing provisions introduced under the Danish rule, King Sigurðr and his brothers 
were ostensibly restoring the legal order as it had been in the “days of St Óláfr”. This notion 
proved prone to develop ideologically charged connotations. The legal status of the “days of 
St Óláfr”, or what it was thought to have been, became a reference point with which usages 
and customs of the day could be compared and judged. 
A reference to the “days of King Óláfr the Saint” also makes an appearance in another 
article of Frostuþingsbok that treats the law of waters. It provides that some rivers should 
always be laid open while others can be fenced under certain conditions: 
If a man owns the land on both sides of a stream that cannot be used for floating timbers [or for 
transportation], he may throw a fence across it, if he wishes to do so; but if those who live 
higher up the stream shall protest that this was not done in the days of Óláfr the Saint, let them 
proceed to place a ban and to appoint a five-day moot; and let the man who built the fence be 
allowed to present his witnesses.122 
Despite the peculiar terminology used in the article, the classification envisaged here seems 
essentially clear: an unconditional prohibition applies to the principal rivers that fall into the 
sea but one can in principle block a tributary.123 The reason for this differentiation is probably, 
on the one hand, that tributaries in Trøndelag are for the most part not suitable for 
transportation and, on the other, that salmon, the main species fished by means of a dam, does 
not go far upstream in the tributaries and consequently fencing them is in most cases unlikely 
to harm the owners who live higher up the river. Still the latter have a right to demand that the 
fence be removed saying that “this was not practiced in the days of Óláfr the Saint,” and the 
burden of proof to the contrary will lie with the owner of the fence. 
The arrangement stipulated here must be very old in the essential. The prohibition of 
fencing bigger rivers was in force at least as early as in the ninth century since the 
organization of the coastal regions into levy districts (skipreiður) “as far inland as the salmon 
                                                 
122 F 13.9, ed. Keyser and Munch in NgL 1: 243: “En um ár allar er eigi eru flotrennar. þá scal þar gerða yfir ef 
vill. oc á hann iörð báðum megin til. En ef þeir er fyrir ofan sitia segia at eigi var svá gört um daga Ólafs hins 
helga. þá fari þeir til oc festi lög fyrir oc leggi fimtarstemnu oc nióti sá vitnis síns er gerði”; transl. Larson p. 381. 
123 For this and what follows see: U. A. Motzfeldt, Den norske vasdragsrets historie indtil aaret 1800, 
Avhandlinger utg. ved Det juridiske fakultet, Kristiania, no. 1 (Kristiania: Brøgger, 1908), pp. 53–56. 
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goes upstream” clearly implied it;124 at the same time, nothing indicates that a parallel 
prohibition concerned minor rivers.125 That the rules were on the whole the same in the “days 
of St Óláfr,” is most likely. 
A concern that no one should make changes on the river at the expense of his neighbours, 
which is evident in this article of Frostuþingsbók, is equally emphasized in Gulaþingsbók: 
“Everyone shall have the pools (uatn) and the fishing grounds (veiðistoð) that he had in 
former times (at fyrnsku haft)”, and: “No one shall damage another man’s fishing place (veiði 
stoð) or forbid him the use of it, if it has belong to him formerly (at forno fare)”.126 
The seemingly greater precision of the stipulation in Frostuþingsbók (not just at fyrnsku or 
at forno fare but specifically um daga Ólafs hins helga) could hardly have made much 
difference in practice. Not that it was in itself impossible to furnish evidence of the events 
which took place in the neighbourhood some two hundred years before, but there was 
apparently no need to recall the past as distant as the “days of Óláfr the Saint” if a conflict 
arose: the point at issue was whether anyone suffered losses as a result of fencing the river 
downstream, and if this was the case, the injured party must have reacted immediately. 
It is interesting to note that in the surviving documentary material there is an example of a 
conflict over fishing rights when an appeal to the “days of St Óláfr” was actually made. 
Significantly, it appears to have played but a minor role in the judicial settlement as such. The 
course of events can be reconstructed on the basis of a letter of protection issued on the 
occasion by Bishop Ivar skjálgi of Hamar (d. 1221).127 The inhabitants of Garmo farm in 
                                                 
124 Hkr (Hákgóð) 20, ed. Bjarni Aðalbjarnarson 1: 175–76: “Hákon konungr [setti] þat í lögum um alt land með 
sjá ok svá langt upp á land sem lax gengr upp ofast, at hann skipaði allri byggð ok skipti í skipreiður, en hann 
skipti skipreiðum í fylki.” Cf. Motzfeldt, Den norske vasdragsrets historie, pp. 21–24, 124. 
125 Motzfeldt, Den norske vasdragsrets historie, pp. 24–30. 
126 G 93 and 85, ed. Keyser and Munch in NgL 1: 45, 42; transl. Larson, pp. 103, 96. 
127 Dipl Norv 2 no. 4: “Ollum guðs vinum ok sinum þæim sem þetta bref sea æder hœyra verandom ok vider 
komandom. sendir Jfwer biscup quædiu guðs ok sinæ. sia hærmingh var aat hofuud kirkiu a Lom firir mer 
Þorgæiri ærkidiakne Þore loghmanne Simone kapalin Atla preste Paale j Bœiom Æiriki vnga Gunnare bior Birni 
bratta (ok) morghum odrum godom monnum lærdom ok olærdom at þa er hin hælghi Olafuer konongr kom 
kristni aa Loar þa gaf han Þorgæiri gamlæ a Garmoe vatn þat er Þessir hæitir ok ollu hans afspringhi. en han 
snerez sidan till truar ok het þui sem han let gera kirkiu a bœ sinom. ok baroz hær æftir twæggiæ manna vithni 
þeira hinna ællzto j Varlldale at swa hermdo fæder þeira ok forælldri firir þæim ok swa var satt. Ok þa ænn aðr 
er a gango men gerdoz till þa gerdo þeir þæim till a alþinghi vatta stæfnu till vazsens ok komo þesser j stæfnu 
dagh rettan en æighi hinir leto þeir þa læida stæfnu vithni sin. en sidan leto þæir bera fyrnu vitni sin sua at þeir 
hafdo radet þriatighu vettra budar vallum sinum bode ok banne a netrostom sinum ok netloghum ok ollum 
jværka vkuidiat ok vbannat firir huærium manne. Ok sætto þæir tollf manna dom æftir ok twa hœyringia ok leto 
*dœme karle ok kononge ok huærium manne logh en ser handa værk sin oll. ok sagde sua loghmader at þa var 
allt retlægha ok engi komo anduitni j mote. En Kristkirkia j Hamre ok margher adrer hælghir stader æigho þær 
æighner j. Nu lægh ek þær allar æighnir ok vatn þat j guðs hæghnad ok allra hæilaghra manna. firir *bidod ek 
huærium manne rikum ok orikum a þa at ganga. en ef þeir ero nockrer er a ganga þa lægh ek þæim vider bann 
guðs ok hæilaghra manna pauens ok ærkibiscupsens ok allra annara biscupa. en guðs miskun þæim ollum sem 
þetta hallda væll.” The translation in Norske middelalderdokumenter, ed. Sverre Bagge et al. (Bergen: 
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Gudbrandsdalen whose names are not specified had a fishery with some appurtenances on the 
mountain lake Tesse a few miles away. Rival claims to this property were put forward, but the 
identity of the claimants is not clear from the text. Then the people of Garmo sought to secure 
their rights and summoned their opponents to a local thing. When the latter failed to show up 
there, witnesses were produced who testified that the people of Garmo had observed all due 
formalities. Afterwards another sort of witnesses (fyrndarvitni) were presented before the 
judicial assembly and they testified that the people of Garmo had possessed the disputed 
property for the previous thirty years and no one had made any objections to it during that 
term.128 Once this had been established and no witnesses to the contrary had been presented, 
the case was decided in favour of the people of Garmo. It was apparently at a later stage, 
when the bishop came to the district, that the people of Garmo took a further step to secure 
their rights and asked the bishop to give them a letter of protection. On this occasion two 
oldest men of the neighbourhood were present and they told that, according to what their 
fathers had told, St Óláfr had given Tesse lake to some Torgeir gamli and all his kin (to which 
the people of Garmo presumably belonged) when he baptized this part of the country. It is not 
very clear why this story had not been made use of in the legal proceedings proper, and we 
may only speculate that it would not have been especially helpful at that moment because the 
claims to the whole lake had been long out of question since, as we gather from the document, 
it was divided between several owners. In any event, it is clear that the situation as it was in 
the “days of St Óláfr” did not matter much for the judicial settlement of the conflict. 
And yet, however little the bearing of this precision may have been for settlement of 
routine conflicts on the rivers of Trøndelag, the clause sheds light on the attitude which its 
author and his audience evidently shared: the reign of the saint king is envisaged here as the 
time when justice and equity prevailed in all matters. This idea must have played a crucial 
role in the construction of St Óláfr’s image as “the founder of all legal order” and his laws as 
“the genuine palladium of popular freedom”, to cite Konrad Maurer’s expression.129 
                                                                                                                                                        
Universitetsforlaget, 1973), no. 17, p. 78–80, and the summary in Reg Norv 1 no. 439, put a construction on the 
events that differs from the one suggested here. 
128 Norms of canon law governing prescription were apparently applied in this case. Prescription meant 
acquisition of a title or right to property by uninterrupted, unchallenged, and peaceful possession in good faith 
over a variable, long or short, period of time as defined by law. The legal notion of prescription had capital 
importance in canon law and Gratian in his decretum devoted to it a whole section on which naturally the 
decretists commented over and over again. The passages on prescription collected by Gratina are found, with 
few exceptions, already in the works of Ivo of Chartres and others. Gratian discussed the terms required in 
different circumstances (10, 20, 30, and 40 years) in C. 16 q. 3 d.a.c. 16. See further R. H. Helmholz, The Spirit 
of Classical Canon Law (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1996), pp. 174–99. 
129 Maurer, “Die Entstehungszeit der ælteren Gulaþingslög,” p. 106. 
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This image makes an appearance in full glamour on yet another occasion in 
Frostuþingsbók. This time it serves to add weight to the rule that barons (lenðir menn) must 
participate in the naval levy equally with the farmers: 
The barons shall contribute to the levy. Barons shall contribute to the levy just as other freemen 
do and have such a share in the levy ships as [the rule was] in Óláfr’s day; and they shall pay 
dues for every male person who is six winters old or older than seven winters.130 
The point at issue was probably that the aristocracy was involved in the military organization 
both as members of the king’s retinue (hirð) and as participants in the expenses that the 
farmers had to bear in connection with the levy. As the levy obligations were gradually 
transformed into a tax beginning in the late twelfth century, a discontent with this double 
burden must have arisen among the aristocracy but it did not result in a legally established 
class privilege until the 1270s.131 It is evidently against this background that the stipulation in 
question should be seen.  
The farmers had a vested interest in the aristocracy’s participation in the levy because the 
expenses were distributed at this time on the district principle and the larger number of people 
withdrew the heavier was the burden on the rest.132 They must have felt a potential threat to 
their rights and wished to secure their situation by an appeal to the just order of the “days of 
St Óláfr”. This article of the law-book seems like a particularly clear example of a reference 
to the “good old law” channelling the popular sentiment. 
 
Þetta réttarbót gaf Haralldr konungr oc Magnús: 
The Elusive Identity of Two Prominent Figures 
in the History of the “Laws of St Óláfr” 
 
There is a broad consensus among scholars that the early Norwegian collections of law 
contain material of diverse date and provenance, although as a rule it is hard to find a clue to 
sorting out and dating different layers in the wording of individual clauses. A few instances in 
                                                 
130 F 7. 18, ed. Keyser and Munch in NgL 1: 202: “At lendir menn gere leiðangr. Svá sculu lendir menn gera 
leiðangr sem elli hverr búanda. oc slíct eiga í leiðangrs scipum sem var um Ólafs daga oc gera fyrir hvern mann 
er .vj. vetra er gamall eða .vij. vetrum ellre.” 
131 Edvard Bull, Leding, Militær- og finansforfatning i Norge i ældre tid (Kristiania and Copenhagen: Steen, 
1920), pp. 100–5; Grethe Authén Blom, Kongemakt og privilegier i Norge inntil 1387 (Oslo, Bergen, and 
Tromsø: Universitetsforlag, 1967), pp. 267–82. 
132 Blom, Kongemakt, pp. 273–74. 
 43
which a given provision is associated explicitly with a named person form a seeming 
exception in this respect. This is just the case in the article 16.4 of Frostuþingsbók: 
Concerning réttarbœtr. King Haraldr and Magnús gave this rétarbót to the Þrœndir and all men 
of the [same] jurisdiction. The laws that Holy King Óláfr gave and established and all the 
[subsequent] réttarbœtr that their kinsmen – those who presided as kings over the country – 
have given since shall be observed.133 
The identity of the two gentlemen mentioned as the initiators of this provision does not seem 
to raise any doubts for most modern commentators. In Regesta Norvegica the réttarbót is 
attributed to Haraldr Gilli and Magnús blindi and dated approximately to 1130–1134; 
surprisingly, no other options are mentioned.134 Dissentient opinions have, however, been 
voiced: Konrad Maurer made out a case for Haraldr harðráði and Magnús góði135 and Per 
Sveaas Andersen seems to attribute the article to Haraldr harðráði and Magnús berfœttr.136 
Thus, all possible combinations of royal Haraldrs and Magnúses have been suggested. It 
seems, however, that the problems raised by this article are not limited to just this question. 
Indeed, both the form and the precise legal meaning of the text spark awkward questions. 
The article in question is labelled as a réttarbót in the version of Frostuþingsbók from the 
1260s. The same collection includes a few other clauses that are referred to in the same way, 
and their comparison with F 16.4 may be instructive for understanding the meaning implied in 
the term. 
First of all, the same section 16 includes a set of réttarbœtr, which are attributed there to 
Kings Sigurðr, Eysteinn, and Óláfr.137 It is apparently these réttarbœtr that Ágrip and other 
sagas tell about and present as the abolishment of the provisions introduced in Norway under 
King Sveinn and his mother Ælfgifu / Álfífa. Many of the payments to the crown and royal 
prerogatives that the kings renounce in the clauses of Frostuþingsbók correspond directly to 
the saga accounts of the “laws of Álfífa”, and nothing precludes one from seeing other 
provisions in this light too.138 What these provisions have in common is that all of them aim at 
                                                 
133 F 16. 4, ed. Keyser and Munch in NgL 1: 258: “Um réttarbœtr. Þetta réttarbót gaf Haralldr konungr oc 
Magnús Þrœndum oc öllum lögunautum. Lög þau er hinn helgi Ólafr konungr gaf oc setti. oc réttarbót þau alla er 
frændr þeirra hafa síðan gefit. þeir sem konungar hafa at landi setit. þá scal halldaz.” 
134 Reg Norv 1 no. 77. See also Norske middelalderdokumenter, no. 5, p. 22. 
135 Konrad Maurer, “Die Entstehungszeit der älteren Frostuþingslög,” in Abhandlungen der philosophisch-
philologischen Classe der königlich bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 13, pt. 3 (Munich: Verlag 
der Akademie, 1875), p. 64. 
136 Per Sveaas Andersen, Samlingen av Norge, p. 145. 
137 F 16.1–3, ed. Keyser and Munch in NgL 1: 257–58. 
138 See above, pp. 32–35. 
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improving, in one way or another, the subjects’ legal standing, their réttr,139 and it is 
obviously in this sense that they are termed as réttarbœtr. 
A survey of occurrences of the word in contemporary legal sources and in the sagas seems 
to support this interpretation. In Gulaþingsbók the term refers to Kings Magnús góði and 
Hákon Þóris fóstri Magnússon’s abolishment of the same payments to the crown and royal 
prerogatives as in F 16.1–3, though the list is less extensive here.140 In the sagas, royal 
réttarbœtr are mentioned occasionally but for the most part without specifying what they 
consisted in. The saga authors go into some detail only in the case of the above-mentioned 
réttarbót of Hákon Magnússon and the one granted by Óláfr Haraldsson to the Upplanders 
with respect to the levy, taxes, and questions of governance.141 Without attempting at a 
comprehensive definition, we may note that all the réttarbœtr discussed so far regulate the 
subjects’ obligations towards the king, purport to improve the subjects’ legal position, and 
usually imply a waiver of certain rights on the part of the king. 
If we take a look now at F 16.4, a question arises: how to bring it in line with the other 
réttarbœtr? In this provision, it is not so much the legal position, the rights, or the obligations, 
of the king’s subjects as the legal order in general that appears to be the matter of concern: 
“The laws that Holy King Óláfr gave and established and all the [subsequent] réttarbœtr … 
shall be observed”. 
It has been suggested that this clause was meant to give royal réttarbœtr the status of law, 
which they had supposedly lacked previously, and thus to secure the subjects’ legal position 
against an eventual withdrawal of rights once granted.142 The assumptions underlying this 
interpretation deserve closer examination. 
The view that réttarbœtr were originally valid only for the term of the reign of the king 
who gave them is based on the authority of a saga account of a conflict between King Haraldr 
harðráði and the Upplanders. When in an attempt to vindicate their legal advantages over 
people elsewhere in Norway, local farmers cited the réttarbót, which King Óláfr had given 
them, the king took it badly “because he wanted all the Norwegians to have the same status 
                                                 
139 For examples of this usage of the term see Ágrip 9 and 45, ed. Bjarni Einarsson, pp. 13, 42: “Haraldr 
[gráfeldr] … gørði harðan rétt landsmanna ok þeir allir brœðr”; “Þá nam Hákon [fóstri Steigar-Þóris] af 
jólagjafar ok skyldir allar ok landaura gjald við Þrœndi ok við Upplendinga alla, þá er við hónum tóku, ok bœtti 
þar í mót mörgu öðru rétt landsmanna.” 
140 See G 148, ed. Keyser and Munch in NgL 1:58–59. 
141 Msk, ed. Finnur Jónsson, p. 187: “tolldu þeir at O. konungr en helgi hefði gefit þeim rettar bętr imaurgo lagi 
fyr avþrom maunnom beþi um scylldir oc utgorðir oc maurg land raþ undir beenðr [mælt] er [eigi] ero annars 
[staðar] iNoregi.” Cf. Fsk 57, ed. Bjarni Einarsson, p. 271. 
142 Absalon Taranger, “De norske folkelovbøker,” Tidsskrift for Rettsvidenskap 39 (1926) 192, 202 and Tidskrift 
for Rettsvidenskap 41 (1928) 50, 53; Grethe Authén Blom, “Retterbot,” in KLNM 14 (1969), col. 109. 
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(réttr)”, and the end of it was that Haraldr resorted to force. “After that the farmers gave in 
and maintained the laws at the king’s injunction and obeyed all his commands.”143 There is no 
indication here that the réttarbót had no legal validity since King Óláfr was dead; rather the 
point seems to be that no réttarbót is of any efficacy if the king is determined to get his own 
way. 
Further, we may gather from the evidence that the same réttarbót was sometimes given on 
more than one occasion. It seems to have been the case with the réttarbœtr attributed in 
Frostuþingsbók to King Sigurðr and his brothers. According to the sagas, King Hákon 
Magnússon had already made the same provisions, or at least part of them, for the benefit of 
the Þrœndir in the winter of 1103–1104.144 This is not, however, to say that these réttarbœtr 
lost their legal force in the years that intervened or that a special act of renewal on the part of 
the king was necessary to validate them. Rather, confirmation of old and bestowal of new 
réttarbœtr gave the king ample opportunity to display the exercise of power. 
All in all, foundations of the legal authority of the réttarbœtr may not have been clear-cut 
enough and opinions may have differed on whether a particular réttarbót remained binding 
for the king who had not expressly consented to it, and yet there is clearly no reason to 
assume that the réttarbœtr were just temporary provisions at first and that some Kings Haraldr 
and Magnús sought then to change the situation drastically by issuing another réttarbót. 
Finally, the clause in question concerns not only réttarbœtr, but first and foremost “all the 
laws that Holy King Óláfr gave and established”. From the perspective of the suggested 
theory, it must indeed seem strange that a réttarbót should be issued in order to validate laws. 
The stipulation that the “laws of St Óláfr” be observed, with the apparent imputation that 
they were recently abused, bears an uncanny resemblance to the language of King Hákon 
Hákonarson’s statute of 1260 opening the extant version of Frostuþingsbók. It is easy to see 
the compositional effect resulting from placing these two statements of the royal will in the 
beginning and at the very end of the book of laws: the structure of the book becomes complete 
and balanced and the potentiality emerges of presenting anything in the book, when 
appropriate, as a valid statement of the laws of the saint king.145 
                                                 
143 Msk, ed Finnur Jónsson, pp. 187–89; Fsk 57, ed. Bjarni Einarsson, pp. 271–73. The court scald Þjóðólfr 
Arnórsson describes the situation vividly in his poem Sexstefja, sts. 20 and 10 (refrain), ed. Finnur Jónsson in 
Skjd I B: 343–44, 341: “Fire was set in retaliation (at gjaldi). The king decided so, and then the tall roof-Garm 
[fire] brought the luckless (or wicked) farmers to reason (en þá téði / hár í hóf at fœra / hrótgarmr búendr 
arma) … There are few options but [to consent to] that which the king then wants to command the people.” 
144 Ágrip 45, ed. Bjarni Einarsson, p. 42; Msk, ed. Finnur Jónsson, p. 297; Fsk 80, ed. Bjarni Einarsson, p. 302; 
Hkr (Mber) 1, ed. Bjarni Aðalbjarnarson 3: 210. 
145 Cf. F i. 16, ed. Storm in NgL 4 : 23: “En ver hugðum þo … at efter hins helga Olafs konongs lagasettning ok 
logmanna orskurðe skyli hver sitt mal til lycta lęiða.” 
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More than anything else, this structural weight raises suspicions about the provenance and 
date of F 16.4. Although it is clearly impossible to maintain that no kings Haraldr and Magnús 
could ever have made a pronouncement touching upon the good old days of King Óláfr or 
sought to restore any legal practices that had purportedly prevailed at that time, the likelihood 
still remains that the clause as it stands now does not predate the Codex Resenianus version of 
Frostuþingsbók, c. 1260–1269.146 
 
The Meaning of the Blended Text in Gulaþingsbók 
 
In the reign of King Magnús Erlingsson, a revision of Gulaþingsbók was undertaken, and 
one of its effects presents some interest in the present connection. In the surviving 
manuscripts of Gulaþingsbók new passages do not replace the older version but stand side by 
side with it forming a peculiar structure. The medieval scribes mark off the two layers 
respectively as Olafr, Ol, or just O and as Magn[us] or simply M. The division is most clear-
cut in the earliest manuscripts and gets increasingly confused in the later ones, apparently 
because the underlying idea was no longer clear.147 
                                                 
146 The tentative connection of F 16.4 with the revision of the law book in the 1260s that we have now suggested 
might shed light on the use of the term réttarbót on this occasion. However “irregular” it may seem against the 
background of the eleventh- and twelfth-century réttarbœtr, this provision could certainly be termed as such in 
the latter half of the thirteenth century. A set of King Hákon Hákonarson’s réttarbœtr, which were given to the 
Þrœndir at the Eyrathing in 1260 and subsequently included in Frostuþingsbók, may serve as an example of this 
later usage, see F i. 22–24, ed. Storm in NgL 4: 24–25, introduced: “En þessar ręttar bætr gafom ver þrændum þa 
er þessor skipan var upplesen oc hanntekin a eyra þingi…” Here the king grants a victim of a thievery or another 
crime against property the right to compensate the losses from the outlawed offender’s property. If we take for 
granted that otherwise the king could lay his hands on everything, as the texts seems to imply, this sounds like a 
réttarbót of the old days: the king waives his legitimate right for the benefit of the people. The next clause 
provides that the ship-district assemblies (skipreiðuþing) should function as courts of judicature so that a suitor 
should not have to go to a county assembly (fylkisþing). Although it is expressly stated there that the provision 
was made “for the convenience of the people” (sęm buondum er hęgligra), it is perhaps significant that a similar 
provision of an earlier date is not termed as a réttarbót, see F 8. 19 and 15. 16, ed. Keyser and Munch in NgL 1: 
208, 257. Finally, the two following clauses, which deal with the redress due to an injured woman or royal 
steward (ármaðr), have nothing to do with the réttarbœtr of the earlier period that we attempted to outline above. 
Rather, they appear to be routine legal arrangements presented as “amendments of law”. Cf. the preamble of 
King Eirik Magnússon’s decree from 1280, ed. Keyser and Munch in NgL 3: 4: “ver kallum skylldu uara uera 
inuirðiliga eptir at sea oc vm at bœta log oc landzsens rett.” This semantic development must have been prepared 
by a (presumably late) shift in the meaning of réttr to “objective legal order” (das objektive Recht) and 
apparently gave rise to an indiscriminate use of the term réttarbœtr for all sorts of royal legislation from the late 
13th century on, see Johan Agerholt, Gamal brevskipnad. Etterrøkjingar og utgreidingar i norsk diplomatikk, 
Meddelelser fra Det norske riksarkiv, vol. 3 (Oslo: Feilberg & Landmark, 1929–1932), pp. 549–50; Blom, 
“Retterbot,” cols. 112–13. On the use of réttr in the sense of the “objective legal order” in medieval 
Scandinavian sources see Klaus von See, Altnordische Rechtswörter, Philologische Studien zur 
Rechtsauffassung und Rechtsgesinnung der Germanen, Hermaea, n.s., vol. 16 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1964), 
pp. 29–30, 52–57. See also Karl Kroeschell’s analysis of a parallel development in Frankish and German legal 
terminology in his “Recht und Rechtsbegriff des 12. Jahrhunderts,” in Probleme des 12. Jahrhunderts, Vorträge 
und Forschungen, vol. 12 (Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 1968), pp. 314–18. 
147 Absalon Taranger, “De norske folkelovbøker,” Tidsskrift for Rettsvidenskap 39 (1926) 188, 197–98. 
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Although the scribes do not specify to which Óláfr they refer, the audience could hardly 
have had any doubts that the person in question was King Óláfr Haraldsson. The belief that 
contemporary laws date back to their establishment by St Óláfr was occasionally expressed by 
Norwegian authors of the late twelfth century, and many others probably shared it in their 
time.148 Apparently the scribes who needed to put a revised passage into the copy felt it 
natural to refer to the preexisting text as the “Óláfr” text. 
The meaning of this division has been much discussed. Konrad Maurer believed that the 
blended text had originated as a result of compilation by a private individual of the original 
and the revised versions of Gulaþingsbók; this approach had been called forth by the confused 
political and legal situation in the country in the reign of King Sverrir and the following 
decades when the validity of the revised law book had become uncertain. The juxtaposition of 
the “Óláfr” text and the “Magnús” text was, in Maurer’s opinion, a matter of practical 
expediency: the one or the other version was to be used according to circumstances.149 
However logically consistent Maurer’s interpretation may appear, his assumption that 
there existed a copy of the pure “Magnús” text is very implausible. As Ebbe Hertzberg has 
pointed out, not only there is no manuscript evidence for it, but also the passages representing 
the revision are interjected in the surrounding text with a degree of syntactical precision that 
strongly suggests that from the start both the “Óláfr” text and the “Magnús” text stood side by 
side in the revised Gulaþingsbók.150 
In this light, the meaning of the blended text becomes all the more perplexing. Absalon 
Taranger sought to solve the problem arguing that all the changes and new articles introduced 
into Gulaþingsbók in the course of the revision were only provisional arrangements clearly 
distinguished from the laws proper (lög); they could subsequently become valid laws if 
acknowledged in practice.151 Taranger based his argument was on an interpretation of the 
term nýmæli, “new law”, which refers in Gulaþingsbók to a couple of new articles introduced 
in the book in the time of the revision, that is, the law of succession and a piece of penal 
legislation.152 The word nýmæli in this sense is rare in Norwegian sources, and Taranger 
                                                 
148 See below, pp. 52–53. 
149 Konrad Maurer, “Die Entstehungszeit der ælteren Gulaþingslög,” pp. 137, 242–43. See also his Udsigt over 
de nordgermanske Retskilders Historie (Kristiania: Brøgger, 1878), pp. 18–21. 
150 Ebbe Hertzberg, De nordiske Retskilder, Nordisk Retsencyklopædi, vol. 1, pt. 2 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 
1890), pp. 40–41. Cf. Finnur Jónsson, Lit. hist. 2: 989. 
151 Taranger, “De norske folkelovbøker,” Tidsskrift for Rettsvidenskap 39 (1926) 198–202. This theory has been 
widely accepted ever since, most recently by Knut Helle in his Gulatinget og Gulatingslova, pp. 16–17. Only 
Edwin Torkelsen has voiced certain reservations, see Edwin Torkelsen and Grethe Authén Blom, “Fra gammel 
rett til ny lov: Noen problemer knyttet til nymælers «gyldighet»,” HT 63 (1984) 260 n. 160. 
152 G 2 and 32, ed. Keyser and Munch in NgL 1: 3–4, 19–20. 
 48
relied heavily on Icelandic evidence, which is considerably richer in this respect. There the 
term occurs not infrequently in narrative and legal texts as well as letters that either were 
written in Iceland or refer to an Icelandic situation. 
The legal force of the Icelandic nýmæli was subject to some remarkable restrictions. In 
Konungsbók of Grágás (GKS 1157 fol.), a clause is interjected between the Christian Laws 
Section and the Assembly Procedures Section: 
No nýmæli is to have effect for more than three summers and it is to be announced at Lögberg 
the first summer and at formally inaugurated spring assemblies or autumn meetings. All nýmæli 
become void if they are not included in the recital every third summer.153 
A somewhat different regulation is known from the following note found in another Icelandic 
manuscript (AM 58 8vo, fol. 117 r): “On nýmæli. All nýmæli are to be put to Lögberg [sic] for 
three summers , thereafter regarded as law.”154 
A discrepancy between the two texts is conspicuous. It is only in the latter that the nýmæli 
are opposed to other laws (lög). It is not very clear, however, what this distinction, central to 
Taranger’s theory, implies in this case. It is also provided here that a nýmæli should be 
regarded as a regular law after a three-year-long trial term. 
The perspective of the other version differs significantly: no explicit distinction is drawn 
there between the nýmæli and other laws but it is stipulated that a nýmæli must be included in 
every lawspeaker’s recital, otherwise it becomes void (lauss). 
The discrepancy may also be rephrased in Taranger’s terms: while the nýmæli eventually 
become the law in one of the versions, in the other they are the law from the start but may 
well cease to be it at any moment. 
Other evidence also indicates that in late-twelfth-century Iceland a nýmæli could become 
null after three years. This was mentioned in an undated letter that Archbishop Eysteinn sent 
to the Icelanders, possibly in 1179. He expressed the hope that people would willingly accept 
a reform of the Icelandic Church although some called it a nýmæli and insisted that it ran 
contrary to the custom: 
                                                 
153 Grágás: Islændernes Lovbog i Fristatens Tid, ed. and transl. Vilhjálmur Finsen, 4 vols., Nordiske Oldskrifter, 
vols. 11, 17, 21–22, 32 (Copenhagen: Det nordiske Literatur-Samfund, 1852–70; hereafter the first two volumes, 
that is, the edition of the Old Icelandic text, are cited as Grg. 1 a and b) 1a: 37: “Lög oll scolo vera sogð vpp a 
þrimr sumrum. scal þa logsogv maþr af hendi bioþa lavgsogvna. Nymæli ecci scal vera lengr raþit eN .iij. sumur. 
oc scal at logbergi it fyrsta sumar vpp segia. a uarþingum helgoðvm eþa leiþum. Lavs erv øll nymæli ef eigi 
uerþa vpp sogð it .iij. huert sumar.” I cite here and below the translation of Andrew Dennis, Peter Foote, and 
Richard Perkins in Laws of Early Iceland: Grágás, 2 vols., University of Manitoba Icelandic Studies, vols. 3 and 
5 (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1980–2000) 1: 51 and n. 103. 
154 Gragas, Stykker, som findes i det Arnamagnæanske Haandskrift, nr. 351 fol. Skalholtsbok og en Række andre 
Haandskrifter, ed. Vilhjálmur Finsen (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1883; hereafter Grg. 3), p. 443: “ Wm ny laug. 
Nymæli aull skulu 3 sumur til laugbergis laugd wera sijdann fyre laug halldast.” 
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because we impart to you only what the pope has accepted from the canons of holy men, and we 
from him, and we wish that these [injunctions] will receive with you perpetual application and 
observance and not just for three years as I have heard someone bring up in words and in 
contemplation.155 
Although there is, strictly speaking, no external evidence to determine which of the two 
versions of the clause more accurately reflects the functioning of a nýmæli in twelfth-century 
Iceland, it would be unfair to say that the two versions of the nýmæli regulation cited above 
are equally reliable as evidence. The latter version of the clause is not known from any of the 
surviving Grágás copies; it occurs as an isolated note in a manuscript written early in the 
seventeenth century, and it is far from clear on what source the anonymous scribe could 
rely.156 To be sure, some scholars, like Ólafur Lárusson and Einar Arnórsson, accept this note 
as evidence on a level with the version of Konungsbók. One may, however, wonder if this is 
not merely an instance of wishful thinking when they dismiss all source-critical 
considerations and make use of it to substantiate their argument in a debate over the role of 
legislation in the legal order of early Iceland.157 
In any event, it is difficult to understand why this piece of the seventeenth-century 
Icelandic antiquarianism should serve as the touchstone for understanding the nature of the 
blended text in Norwegian Gulaþingsbók. It is far from clear whether the revised articles of 
                                                 
155 Dipl Isl 1 no. 53: “[…] þviat þvi einv midlvm vier uit ydur. er papinn hefur til af heilagra manna settningvm 
tekid. en ver af honum. og villdvm vier at at þav tæke med ydur eilifa nyt. og gæslv. en eigi þrigia vetra einna. 
sem ek spyrr at svmer færi j ord og ætlon.” The convoluted syntax of the letter led the editor to postulate a Latin 
original behind the extant text (Dipl Isl 1: 259), what would make a terminological analysis a tricky task, but in 
fact the fanciful style may well be due to the usages of the archbishop’s chancellery, see Agerholt, Gamal 
brevskipnad, p. 793. 
156 On the manuscript, see Grg. 3: xlvii–viii and 443 ad locum. It contains excerpts from a large number of legal 
texts. The passage at issue stands in between King Christian II’s confirmation (1507) of King Hákon V’s 
réttarbœtr and the text of one of them, concerning Iceland (from 1314, ed. Storm in NgL 4: 348 –53; Dipl Isl 2 
no. 215). 
157 Ólafur Lárusson, Yfirlit yfir íslenska rjettarsögu (Reykjavik: [s.n.], 1932), p. 103; Einar Arnórsson, 
Réttarsaga Alþingis (Reykjavik: Alþingissögunefnd, 1945), pp. 61–62. The point at issue in the debate is 
whether a simple majority was enough or a unanimous vote was required to pass a nýmæli in the Law Council at 
the General Assembly (alþing). In the absence of direct evidence, the question remains largely a matter of 
speculation. Most Icelandic scholars, beginning with Vilhjálmur Finsen, maintain that the former procedure took 
place and that the passing of nýmæli was a routine business. It might seem difficult to harmonize this view with 
the cited clause of Konungsbók. In the words of Einar Arnórsson: “This regulation was not in all respects 
fortunate and rather vague. How long should a law that had once been a nýmæli have borne that name? A 
hundred-year-old law was a nýmæli once, but few people would have so called it when it had reached this age. It 
must have become so deeply rooted in the popular consciousness that it would have been unnatural if the 
Lawspeaker had made it void by the simple fact that he forgot it and other members of the Law Council did not 
remember it either, or did not care.” Accordingly Einar Arnórsson suggests that the version of AM 58 8vo might 
have superseded at some time the other version of the clause. It is only natural that Konrad Maurer, who ascribed 
a far lesser importance to legislation in the Icelandic legal order, dismissed altogether the note in AM 58 8vo on 
source-critical grounds, see his “Die Rechtsrichtung des älteren isländischen Rechtes,” in Festgabe zum 
Doctorjubiläum des Herrn Geheimen Raths und Professors Dr. Joh. Jul. Wilh. v. Planck (Munich: Kaiser, 1887), 
pp. 145–46. The question itself about the scale of legislative activity is of course considerably broader than this. 
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the book other than those two that are actually labelled as nýmæli in the manuscripts would 
have been so called by the contemporary Norwegian audience. 
Taranger presumes that the Icelandic regulations concerning nýmæli were customary law 
in Norway at that time. As supporting evidence he cites the article G 32 introduced “Magnús 
gerði þetta nymęli …” and maintains that the “adoption of this nýmæli in the recital of laws 
and in Gulaþingsbók was carried on by stages in the course of a hundred years”.158 But in 
manuscript NRA 1 B a (c. 1200159), which is adduced as decisive evidence, the text of the 
article fills the page to the bottom, and there is no reason to doubt that it continued on the 
following leaf, now lost.160 That the text written en bloc in a later manuscript is divided here 
into smaller sections, does not indicate the “adoption by stages” either. 
The sources are deafeningly silent about this revision, and nothing is known with certainty 
about the procedure that was adopted on this occasion. It is significant, however, that the 
blended structure must have been original. It is also clear that this sort of text did not lend 
itself easily either to oral recital generally or specifically to an oral procedure of passing at the 
assembly.161 The theory of an official law book as it has been forward by Taranger should 
perhaps be regarded with a certain degree of scepticism as far as Gulaþingsbók is concerned. 
Unlike Frostuþingsbók, it does not give any evidence that the book as a whole was ever 
formally accepted on any occasion.162 It says, of course, that the laws governing the coast 
defence (landvörn) were written down in a presumably “official” manner. But it is striking 
that an express doubt is voiced here about the relative validity of this written statement and a 
divergent oral recital: 
We have now written down the laws governing the coast defence but we do not know whether 
the statement is right or wrong. But even though it be wrong, we shall keep the legal 
arrangements as to the levy that we had of old and which Atli recited before the men at Gula, 
unless the king wishes to give us other [plans], and we shall all agree to them.163 
                                                 
158 Taranger, “De norske folkelovbøker,” Tidsskrift for Rettsvidenskap 39 (1926) 197–98. 
159 Didrik Arup Seip, Palæografi: Norge og Island, Nordisk Kultur, vol. 28: B (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1954), p. 6. 
160 NgL 4 pl. 13; Den eldre Gulatingsloven, ed. by Finn Hødnebø and Magnus Rindal, Corpus codicum 
Norvegicorum medii aevi, Quarto series, vol. 9 (Oslo: Selskapet til utgivelse av gamle norske håndskrifter, 
1995), p. 221. There is room for one more line at the bottom of the leaf, but it was the end of a section and the 
scribe started each section on a new line so that it would have been left pending if he had chosen to fill the last 
line. 
161 Cf. Helle, Gulatinget og Gulatingslova, p. 18. 
162 F 12.1, ed. Keyser and Munch in NgL 1: 236, says “síðan … er bók siá var tecin,” although it is not clear 
when and under what circumstances this event took place. It is also interesting that there is a number of instances 
in Frostuþingsbók when a reference is made to the book as a whole: F 1.2; 2.10; 9.19; 10.23, not to mention F i. 
7, 9, 14, and 21 (King Hákon Hákonarson’s ordinance, c. 1260). Nothing of the kind is to be found in 
Gulaþingsbók. 
163 G 314, ed. Keyser and Munch in NgL 1: 104: “Nu hafum vér landvorn vara a skra setta. oc vitum eigi hvárt 
þat er rett æða ragnt. En þo at ragnt se. þa scolom vér þat logmal hava um utgerðir várar er fyrr hever verit. oc 
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All in all, it is not clear what role an “official” law book could play at the thing before the 
monarchy took a keen interest in the administration of justice and put forward the demand that 
all cases should be adjudicated in accordance with the law book. The workings of the judicial 
system and settlement of conflicts in medieval Norway needs much further research before 
the issue about the part that the early collections of laws played at the things can be addressed 
on a more secure ground. From the start, however, it seems unjustified to think of these 
collections by analogy with modern law codes or reference books for those who sat in 
judgement to consult and distribute the prescribed fines accordingly.164 
The question arises then whether the books of laws might have had other functions apart 
from their less than clear-cut role in assembly procedure – functions, or meanings, that a 
modern Gesetzbuch does not possess. Furthermore, we would suggest that these functions 
should be taken into consideration when interpreting the blended text of Gulaþingsbók. In 
fact, it is characteristic of many medieval collections of laws that they retain obsolete legal 
provisions and juxtapose them with new law. These features in a given collection do not 
necessarily imply that it was “private” or, in other words, that the public authorities took no 
interest in its production and / or dissemination. A well-known example is Frankish Lex 
Salica. It has been suggested that a great deal of its articles contained law that was already 
obsolete or obsolescent at the moment it was first committed to writing early in the sixth 
century; moreover, the collection was revised and widely disseminated in the reign of 
Charlemagne, apparently at official instigation, although even the revised version remained 
strikingly outdated and “impractical”.165 A pronounced interest in old law is apparent in many 
Scandinavian books of laws. Thus Östgötalag written late in the thirteenth century often 
contrasts old and new provisions on the same subject, as for example in Bb 2.1: “þa uar þæt 
sua först i laghum … nu ær þæt sua stat …” Sometimes the initiator of the new law is 
                                                                                                                                                        
Atle talde firi monnum i Gula. nema konongr vár vili oss œðrom iatta. oc verðim vér satter aller saman”; transl. 
Larson, p. 200. 
164 Apart from the cleavage between the laws and the sagas that has been often emphasized, the books of laws 
give enough evidence to illustrate this point. Cf., e.g., the introduction to the section about wergelds in F 6.1, ed. 
Keyser and Munch in NgL 1: 184: “Her hefr upp oc segir í frá því er flestum er myrkt oc þyrftu þó marger at 
vita. fyrer því at vandræði vara manna á millum. en þeir þverra er bæði höfðu til vit oc góðan vilia. hvesso scipta 
scylldi ákveðnum bótum ef þar ero dœmdar. fyrer því at þat er nú meiri siðr at ánemna bœtr hvesso margar mercr 
gulls uppi sculu vera epter þann er af var tecinn. oc velldr þat at marger vito eigi hvat laga bót er. en þo at vissi. 
þá vilia nú fáer því una. En frostoþings bóc scipter lagabót hveriom epter sínum burð oc metorði en ecki hinum 
bótum er þeir ofsa eða vansa er í dómum sitia oc sáttmál gera.” Konrad Maurer, Vorlesungen über altnordischen 
Rechtsgeschichte, 5 vols. (Leipzig: Deichert, 1907–10) 3: 65, dates the section to the early decades of the 
thirteenth century. 
165 Hermann Nehlsen, “Zu Aktualität und Effektivität der älteren germanischen Rechtsaufzeichnungen,” in Recht 
und Schrift, ed. by Peter Classen, Vorträge und Forschungen, vol. 23 (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1977), pp. 449–
502; Ruth Schmidt-Wiegand, “Lex Salica,” in HRG 2 (1978) 1949–62. 
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mentioned. On one occasion the development of a particular regulation is traced trough 
several stages.166 
It would perhaps be an anachronism to attribute this attention to outdated laws to an 
academic interest in legal history on the part of the compilers and scribes. Rather it suggests 
that history and law were not two things apart for the medieval audience and collections of 
laws were often an important vehicle for historical self-identification. Setting out “Óláfr” and 
“Magnús” side by side as the old and the new, the editors of Gulaþingsbók, so to speak, 
thematized continuity and change in law and society. There is no reason to think that they 
regarded the new laws as less valid because of their juxtaposition with abrogated sections in 
the book, even though they attributed these sections to Óláfr. They were not so much 
opposing themselves to the saint king as pursuing the development of a Christian society that 
he had initiated. Demarcating this way with the two royal names, they made the “laws of 
St Óláfr” more readily visible than perhaps ever before. 
 
                                                 
166 Östgötalagen (Bygda balkær) 3.2, ed. H. S. Collin and C. J. Schlyter in Samling af Sweriges gamla lagar, 13 
vols. (Stockholm: [imprint varies], 1827–77) 2: 192. Cf. Sten Gagnér, “i knutzs kunungxs daghum,” Tidskrift 
udgiven av Juridiska Föreningen i Finland 97 (1961) 102–40; Olle Ekstedt, “Äro alla skiftesreglerna i 
Östgötalagen av samma ålder?” [Svensk] Historisk Tidskrift 82 (1962) 432; Carl Ivar Ståhle, “Östgötalagen,” in 
KLNM 21 (1977), cols. 50–51; D. Strauch, “Östgötalag,” in RGA 22 (2003) 3. 
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CHAPTER   3 
The Age of Bloom, c. 1160–c. 1260 
 
 
 
 
The Twelfth-Century Ecclesiastical Literature 
 
There is a broad consensus among scholars that hagiographical tradition has exercised strong 
influence on the development of ideas about the “laws of St Óláfr”. It is clear that some sort 
of ecclesiastical legend of the saint king must already have existed in the earliest phases of the 
history of the cult, but our knowledge of this tradition is very limited indeed. Whether the 
Church ascribed to St Óláfr any legislation already at that time is only a matter of conjecture. 
It is only with the establishment of the archbishopric in Nidaros in 1152~53 and the 
subsequent bloom of hagiographical and historical writing in the latter half of the century that 
we are able to get the image of St Óláfr as conceived of by the Church in sharper focus. The 
ecclesiastical authors of that time attach much significance to the saint’s legislative 
endeavour, although they put varying emphasis on individual aspects of it. 
The life of St Óláfr, Passio Olavi, was written in the milieu around Archbishop Eysteinn 
or perhaps even by the archbishop himself. This text formed a base of the liturgical 
commemoration of the saint. Also, it could be utilized for purposes of edifying reading, but in 
this respect the vernacular version preserved in the so-called “Norwegian Homily Book must 
have been of greater importance. 
Portraying St Óláfr as paragon of royal virtues, the life also gives prominence to the 
protagonist’s legal activity.167 The hagiographer sets forth the motives that led Óláfr to 
                                                 
167 Passio et Miracula Beati Olaui, ed. F. Metcalfe (Oxford: Clarendon, 1881), pp. 70–71: “Nichil regii fastus, 
nichil tirannidis in suos exercebat subditos […] In futuro eciam prouinciis quibus preerat prouidens, ne 
nobiliores quique et potenciores per potenciam humiliores opprimerent, leges diuinas et humanas multa plenas 
sapientia et mira compositas discretione scripsit et promulgauit; in quibus suum cuique conditioni ius assignauit. 
In illis etiam, quantum liceret prelatis in subiectos, et quantam subiecti reuerenciam exhiberent erga prelatos, 
certis limitibus discreuit. Ibi modestissimus et equissimus arbiter, sapienter considerans plerumque reges 
potestate sibi consessa superbe abuti in subditos, legum rigore regalem cohercuit et refrenauit licenciam. In illis 
regibus [legibus] claret quam deuotus erga deum, quam benignus erga proximum rex gloriosus extiterit.” In the 
following I cite, with alterations, the translation of Devra Kunin in A History of Norway and The Passion and 
Miracles of the Blessed Óláfr, Viking Society for Northern Research, Text series, vol. 13 (London: Viking 
Society for Northern Research, University College London, 1998), p. 29. The passage in question is lacking from 
another version of Passio Olavi found in a late-twelfth-century French manuscript published as an appendix to 
Eyolf Østrem’s dissertation The Office of Saint Olav: A Study in Chant Transmission, Studia musicologica 
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compose and promulgate laws: as a good king he was concerned for the future of the people 
he ruled. His legislation was primarily aimed at organizing an ordered society. The author 
lays particular stress on the regulation of three important societal relations, which the saint 
king’s laws provided: 
(i) The “laws of St Óláfr” established a balance between different social layers: “lest 
the lordly and powerful should oppress the lowly with their might,” the king 
“assigned to each estate its proper rights.” The balance was founded on the 
principle of justice in its conventional medieval sense of suum cuique. This 
formula ultimately stems from the Roman jurist Ulpian who explained justice as a 
“constant and enduring will to give to everyone that to which he is entitled” and 
from Cicero for whom justice was a “habit of the mind which gives everyone their 
due, preserving [a proper regard to] the general welfare.”168 Possibly, the author of 
Passio Olavi was also influenced by a somewhat divergent tradition which 
understood justice as something that benefited most those who had least power and 
acted for the relief of the poor.169 
(ii) The relationships between the Church and the secular society: the saint king 
“determined within strict bounds what authority the bishops should have over their 
people and what deference the people should show their bishops.” It is interesting 
to note that the author does not bring up the question of the prerogatives of the 
spiritual and the temporal power. His statement that the king issued “laws 
pertaining to things sacred and things profane” (leges diuinas et humanas) might 
have sounded a little uncircumspect to a zealous Gregorianist, but for the author 
who is at pains to prove the apostolic status of his protagonist, Óláfr is clearly 
much more than an ordinary secular ruler. 
(iii) The king and the people. The hagiographer insists that Óláfr was the complete 
opposite of a tyrant. Moreover, “wisely bearing in mind how often kings 
arrogantly misused power committed to them over their subjects, he restrained and 
bridled royal licence with the rigour of law.” The author’s language is not 
immediately transparent. It is plain that Óláfr professed himself bound by the laws. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Upsaliensia, n.s, vol. 18 (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2001). I am grateful to Prof. Lars Boje 
Mortensen who pointed out to me in his mail from 02.04.2003 that this version must be an abridgement of the 
fuller version. 
168 Ulpian, Dig. 1.1.10.pr.: “Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi”; Cic., de inuent. 
2.53.160: “Iustitia est habitus animi communi utilitate conservata suam cuique tribuens dignitatem.” 
169 See Stephan Kuttner, “A Forgotten Definition of Justice,” Studia Gratiana 20 (1976) 75–109, reprinted with 
additional notes and corrections in his The History of Ideas and Doctrines of Canon Law in the Middle Ages, 2nd 
ed. (London: Variorum Reprints, 1992), with original pagination. 
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As such, the idea of a limitation of the monarchy by the laws is almost 
commonplace on the lips of an ecclesiastic. The important question is rather what 
sort of obligation on the part of the king the author of Passio Olavi is implying. 
Probably, his words meant different thing to different audiences. The “rigour of 
law” is construed by the author of the vernacular version of the saint’s life in the 
so-called “Norwegian Homily Book” as legal sanctions (sektir) imposed by Óláfr 
on posterior kings and their officials “in case they violate truth.”170 It is hard to tell 
why the writer of Passio Olavi has chosen not to concretize in a similar way the 
nature of limitation that the saint king’s laws laid on the royal power. Possibly, his 
understanding of juristic problems involved in the issue was more sophisticated 
and well-informed than that of the writer of the vernacular version.171 More 
probably, the reason was that his principal concern lay in emphasising his 
protagonist’s sense of equity and moderation. In Passio Olavi the relevance of 
St Óláfr’s self-imposed limitation by the laws for the actuality of the author’s day 
is mainly the one of a commendable example. 
The picture of St Óláfr as legislator is an essential part of the image of a prudent and just 
king that Passio Olavi conveys to the reader. As we have indicated, the author builds up his 
account of the saint king’s legislation to a great extent drawing on stock themes of medieval 
legal and political thought. In fact, for many medieval litterati legislative activity was 
something expected of a good king. The royal function leges renovare, leges statuere, etc., 
was already present in the writings of Carolingian ecclesiastics.172 With the revival of interest 
in Roman law from the eleventh century on royal lawgivers and their panegyrists picked up 
                                                 
170 Gamal norsk homiliebok, Cod. AM 619 4º, ed. Gustav Indrebø (Oslo: Dybwad, 1931), p. 110: “Stillir hann oc 
konunga ok konungs menn. lastar of-dramb þæirra ok of mykin yfir-gang. ok lægr við sectir ef þæir ganga yfir 
hit sanna.” 
171 In the opinion of the contemporary learned law jurists, the Prince was exempt from the coercive power of the 
laws since there existed no legal machinery for bringing him to justice if he broke them. He could not bind 
himself by his laws in the sense that he could not, in any meaningful sense, issue a command to himself. Nor 
could he bind his successors since, to quote a Roman law maxim, “an equal does not have authority over an 
equal.” Nevertheless, they fully recognized the Prince’s obligation to obey the law; the point was that the fidelity 
to the law, which was required of all men, had to be maintained in the case of the Prince alone through internal 
rather than external discipline. See particularly Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, A Study in 
Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 94–96, 102–07, 135–36, 143–
64; Brian Tierney, “‘The Prince is Not Bound by the Laws.’ Accursius and the Origins of the Modern State,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 5 (1963) 378–400, and “Bracton on Government,” Speculum 38 
(1963) 301, 303–04, 309, both reprinted in his Church Law and Constitutional Thought in the Middle Ages 
(London: Variorum Reprints, 1979), with original pagination; Kenneth Pennington, The Prince and the Law, 
1200-1600: Sovereignty and Rights in the Western Legal Tradition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993), pp. 77–90. 
172 See Hans Hubert Anton, Fürstenspiegel und Herrscherethos in der Karolingerzeit, Bonner historische 
Forschungen, vol. 32 (Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1968), pp. 78, 105; Janet L. Nelson, “Kingship, law and liturgy in the 
political thought of Hincmar of Rheims,” English Historical Review 92 (1977) 242–43. 
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and developed the classical topos of sovereign power furnished with arms and adorned with 
laws.173 The appeal of the image was apparently so irresistible that at least one royal 
biographer was able to display his hero as a law-reformer, unembarrassed by the fact that both 
he himself and his audience knew perfectly well that the king in question had shown no 
interest in these matters.174 It is clear that the author of Passio Olavi had a fully respectable 
tradition to rely on when he chose to present his protagonist in a legislator’s robe. 
Yet the hagiographer’s description of St Óláfr’s legislation does not seem to be simply an 
exercise in eulogy or a nod to nostalgia for the irrevocable Norway ruled by the saint king. At 
the opening of his account the author indicates that these laws were to shape the future of the 
country. What is here just a half-veiled hint, is made absolutely explicit in another report of 
Óláfr’s lawgiving written by Theodoricus Monachus at about the same time and in the same 
literary milieu.175 According to his Historia de antiquitate regum Norwagiensium, these laws, 
“replete with justice and equity,” were “committed to writing in the native language.” To 
judge from this detail, the chronicler is thinking of a specific body of legislation. We are told, 
moreover, that the laws given by the saint king are “to this day upheld and venerated by all 
good men.”176 The assertion may sound quite cheerful but we know that Theodoricus was far 
from writing a panegyric on the Norway of his day. After the death of King Sigurðr 
Jórsalafari the author’s countrymen have, in his judgement, immersed themselves in the 
“crimes, killings, perjuries, parricides, desecrations of holy places, the contempt for God, the 
plundering no less of the clergy than of the whole people, the abductions of women, and other 
abominations which it would take long to enumerate.”177 Seemingly, his words about the 
                                                 
173 Medieval jurists found its definitive formulation at the opening of Justinian’s Constitutio promulgating the 
Institutes, see Inst. prooem.: “It is expedient that the Imperial Majesty not only be distinguished by arms (armis 
decoratam), but also be protected by laws (legibus armatam), so that government may be justly administered in 
time of both war and peace, and the Roman Sovereign not only may emerge victorious from battle with the 
enemy, but also by legitimate measures may defeat the evil designs of wicked men and appear as strict in the 
administration of justice (iuris religiosissimus) as triumphant over conquered foes.” I cite the translation of 
Samuel P. Scott in The Civil Law, 17 vols. (Cincinnati: The Central Trust Company, 1932) 2 : 3. 
174 See Vita Ædwardi Regis 1.1, ed. and trans. Frank Barlow, 2nd ed., Oxford Medieval Texts (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1992), pp. 18–21, and the remarks of Frank Barlow, Edward the Confessor (London: Eyre & 
Spottiswoode, 1970), p. 178, and Wormald, The making of English law 1: 128–29. 
175 The relationship between Theodoricus and Passio Olavi remains a matter of dispute among scholars, but there 
seem to be good reasons to assume that the work of Theodoricus served as a source for Passio Olavi. See most 
recently Lars Boje Mortensen, “The Anchin manuscript of Passio Olaui (Douai 295), William of Jumiège, and 
Theodoricus Monachus: New evidence for intellectual relations between Norway and France in the 12th 
century,” Symbolae Osloenses 75 (2000) 165–89. 
176 Theodoricus Monachus, Historia de antiquitate regum Norwagiensium 16, ed. Gustav Storm in Monumenta 
historica Norvegiae, Latinske Kildeskrifter til Norges Historie i Middelalderen (Kristiania: Brøgger, 1880; 
heafer MHN), p. 29; An Account of the Ancient History, p. 21. 
177 Theodoricus Monachus, Historia de antiquitate 34, ed. Storm in MHN, p. 67; An Account of the Ancient 
History, p. 53. 
 57
“good people” observing St Óláfr’s laws do not imply that their number was large among his 
contemporaries. 
The idea expressed by Theodoricus that the saint king’s legislation was still valid law in 
Norway was repeatedly echoed over the following decades. The writer of the vernacular 
version of the life of St Óláfr in the “Norwegian Homily Book” inserts an affirmation to that 
effect into his rendition of the Latin original.178 The “Legendary saga” claims that all Óláfr’s 
successors have been obliged to the observance of these laws but the reader is kept in 
ignorance of whether or not they have actually abided by them.179 The author of Fagrskinna is 
more positive on the matter: the saint king made laws and cast them in the form they have 
since been upheld (á þá leið, sem síðan hafa haldizk). His upbeat tone conforms very well to 
his general enthusiasm for the Norwegian royalty.180 Remarkably, the Danish Saxo 
Grammaticus shares the opinion that the laws once instituted by St Óláfr are still in force in 
Norway of his day.181 This unanimity of authors of different political stands and of different 
nationality is indeed remarkable. 
 
Sverris saga 
 
In order to understand the reasons for this trend, we must take into account not only the 
growing fame of Óláfr as saint but also the prominent part he came to play at that time in the 
self-representation of the Norwegian kingship, particularly in the reign of King Magnús 
Erlingsson and his rival and successor Sverrir. It will be enough for our purposes to briefly 
indicate the main features of this ideology christened “olavsideologi” in contemporary 
Norwegian scholarship. 
In the much discussed privilege issued for the benefit of the archbishopric at some point in 
the 1160s or ’70s, Magnús Erlingsson “assigned” himself and his realm forever to St Óláfr 
                                                 
178 Gamal norsk homiliebok, ed. Indrebø, p. 110: “Afterwards he established laws among people which have 
since been upheld across the whole country.” 
179 Ólhelg (Leg) 38, ed. Johnsen, p. 35: “King Óláfr had the custody of this people by divine will and right and 
according to the secular laws which he gave and every king has since been obliged to uphold.” 
180 Fsk 31, ed. Bjarni Einarson, p. 181. It is only in Fagrskinna that we find undisguised eulogy of the 
Norwegian royal house, see the words about King Haraldr hárfagri in Fsk 2, ed. Bjarni Einarson, p. 58–59: “… 
hann skyldi vera yfirmaðr Norðmanna ríkis, er af hans ætt hefir tignazk þat land hér til ok svá mun vera jafnan.” 
It has often been suggested that the saga was written for King Hákon Hákonarson, see especially Gustav Indrebø, 
Fagrskinna, pp. 275–78, and Kolbrún Haraldsdóttir, “Fagrskinna,” in RGA 8 (1994) 149, with references to the 
literature. 
181 Saxo Grammaticus, Gesta Danorum 10.16.2, ed. J. Olrik and H. Ræder, 2 vols. (Copenhagen: Levin and 
Munksgaard, 1931–57) 1: 288: “Idem ignarum iuris populum passimque et agresti more viventem legibus 
salubriter editus ad melioris vitae habitum perduxit, quarum vetusta monumenta plebs Norica praesenti 
veneratione complecitur.” 
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and promised to govern the kingdom “as this glorious martyr’s hereditary possession under 
his dominion in the capacity of his vicar and of his vassal”, or literally, “his tenant”. Further 
the king professed himself to be the saint’s miles, that is, “soldier” or perhaps “knight”, and 
expressed his readiness to defend the country as St Óláfr’s “possession”. As a token of his 
eternal subjection, he gave the saint’s church the right to receive posthumously his crown and 
those of his successors and, in confirmation, he placed his crown on the alter.182 
This peculiar document has been convincingly interpreted, against the background of the 
contemporary political situation, as a part of the complex diplomatic manoeuvres that aimed 
to secure Magnús Erlingsson’s positions against his adversaries within the country and repel 
the pressing Danish claims to overlordship. Under these circumstances it may have seemed 
much more advantageous for the Norwegian king to become St Óláfr’s vassal than that of 
King Valdemar.183 It has also been suggested that the king’s position as St Óláfr’s vicar and 
vassal entailed an obligation on his part to comply with the ideal of a rex iustus, which, in the 
contemporary interpretation, meant above all that the king should show obedience to the 
church and respect its liberty (and if Magnús failed to do so, the Church would render him 
answerable).184 Altogether, in those years St Óláfr appeared as the “perpetual king of 
Norway”185 as conspicuously as probably never before. 
Paradoxically enough, the theme of St Óláfr’s eternal kingship was continued by Magnús 
Erlingsson’s most virulent political rival, Sverrir, who was at pains to present himself as the 
saint king’s favourite. Nowhere is this contention more apparent than in a dream-story of his 
told in Sverris saga: Sverrir dreams that he comes to Norway where he becomes involved in a 
                                                 
182 Priuilegium regis Magni, ed. Eirik Vandvik and Vegard Skånland in Vandvik, Magnus Erlingssons 
privilegiebrev og kongevigsle, Skrifter utg. av Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademi i Oslo, II. Hist.-Filos. Kl., n.s., 
no. 1. (Oslo, 1962), pp. 12–16. 
183 This line of argument has developed particularly by Fredrik Paasche, Kong Sverre, 2nd ed. (Kristiania: 
Aschehoug, 1923), pp. 128–33, and Halvdan Koht, “Noreg eit len av St. Olav,” HT 30 (1934–36) 81–109. Being 
a vassal was not considered at this time as disgraceful by itself (after all, the royal office was sometimes 
conceived of as a fief received from God, see Percy Ernst Schramm, Der König von Frankreich: Das Wesen der 
Monarchie vom 9. bis zum 16. Jahrhundert, 2nd ed. [Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1960], 
p. 107), what really mattered was to have obligations to higher rather than a lower overlord, and the highest 
liberty and honour was to depend on God alone; cf. Karl J. Leyser, “The Polemics of the Papal Revolution,” in 
Trends in Medieval Political Thought, ed. Beryl Smalley (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965), p. 53. An important 
implication of the allegiance was that, from a juristic point of view, no one could arguably be a vassal of two 
lords at the same time; this consideration encouraged many medieval rulers pressed by feudal claims of their 
more powerful neighbours to become liegemen of the Roman curia, as is pointed out by Walter Ullmann, The 
Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages, 3rd ed. (London: Methuen, 1970), pp. 335–36. A similar 
motive may well have led King Magnús to proclaim himself St Óláfr’s vassal; the king promised to defend his 
realm “as St Óláfr’s possession”, what seems to have implied that every encroachment on the kingdom would 
have been considered as an injury inflicted on the saint himself. 
184 Torfinn Tobiassen, “Tronfølgelov og privilegiebrev, En studie i kongedømmets ideologi under Magnus 
Erlingsson,” HT 43 (1964) 209–19, 220–21; Erik Gunnes, Kongens ære: Kongemakt og kirke i ‘En tale mot 
biskopene’ (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1971), pp. 145–46. 
185 Historia Norwegiae, ed. Gustav Storm in MHN, p. 109. 
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bitter conflict between King Óláfr the Saint and King Magnús Erlingsson. Predictably 
enough, he chooses to side with Óláfr’s party. Not only is Sverrir welcomed there; the saint 
king himself shows marks of his special grace to his new retainer giving Sverrir a new name, 
Magnús, and handing over to him his own sword and standard with the words, “Take the 
standard, Lord, and ponder over that from now onwards you will always bear this 
standard!”186  
There is no doubt that the developments of the last decades of the twelfth century, which 
we have outlined, decisively influenced the formation of the notion of the “laws of St Óláfr”. 
On the whole, it was apparently a complex interplay of literary images and political actualities 
where impulses did not go just one way: the church formulated its ideals of the kingship 
through the medium of the hagiographic legend, and the saint king’s role as legislator was 
given full prominence there; this picture could fail to make impact on the self-understanding 
of the secular power, but once the monarchy picked up the theme and put it to use in 
furthering its own interests, the men of letters were able to see the “laws of St Óláfr” 
materialize in their own day, and this could not but strengthen their trust in what they were 
reading in the writings of their predecessors. If initially there might have been something of a 
literary topos about the image of St Óláfr as legislator, this did not last long. 
Unlike the men of letters, the kings seem to have had a very concrete and specific idea 
about what these laws amounted to. It is curious that their use of this concept was exclusively 
confined to two specific issues partly connected with each other. Both issues are brought out 
into full relief by the writer of Sverris saga in his accounts of the events of 1190: 
Presently much dissension arose between King Sverrir and Archbishop [Eiríkr], because of an 
agreement made by Archbishop Eysteinn with the yeomen, which King Magnús and Jarl Erlingr 
                                                 
186 Sverris saga 5, ed. Gustav Indrebø in Sverris saga etter Cod. AM 327 4º (Kristiania: Dybwad, 1920), pp. 4–5. 
The imagery of the dream is heavily loaded with symbolic associations. The name Magnús was not only a 
dynastic name of high standing, it was also the name of St Óláfr’s son, Magnús góði, and it obviously placed 
Sverrir in a very special relation to the saint king. Sverrir became Magnús not only in his dream: in the official 
usage the two names stood together, see Fredrik Paasche, “Sverre prest,” Edda 3 (1915) 204, and Kong 
Sverre, pp. 232–33. The insignias, which St Óláfr confers on Sverrir in this dream, the sword and the standard, 
played a significant part in ceremonial representation of the monarch in contemporary Europe. The sword could 
stand both for the bestowal of the royal title and more generally, for the Ruler’s power of coercion, see Percy 
Ernst Schramm, Herrschaftszeichen und Staatssymbolik: Beiträge zu ihrer Geschichte vom dritten bis zum 
sechzehnten Jahrhundert, 3 vols., Schriften der Monumenta Germaniae historica, vol. 13. (Stuttgart: 
Hiersemann, 1954-1956) 2: 651; Jean Flori, L’idéologie du glaive: Préhistoire de la chevalerie (Genève: Droz, 
1983), pp. 83, 89, 90–93. The standard, which Sverrir received from the saint king, places the former on an equal 
footing with other sovereigns of medieval Europe who had a special liking for the role of a standard-bearer of 
celestial powers, see Schramm, Der König von Frankreich, p. 139, and Herrschaftszeichen 2: 652. Finally, it is 
significant that St Óláfr, handing over the standard to Sverrir, addresses him as “lord” (herra); it seems that this 
greeting was reserved for the king at that time, see Lars Hamre, “Herretitel,” in KLNM 6 (1961) 509. Thus, 
through the language of readily understandable symbols, the saga dream conveyed the idea that the saint king 
himself had conferred royal powers on Sverrir. 
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allowed to stand all the time they governed the realm. By this agreement, whenever the 
archbishop had to receive fines, the ounce of pure silver (silfrmerktr eyrir) should be the 
standard in these debts, whereas aforetime fines had been paid in the current ounce as in the 
king’s suits.187 Jarl Erlingr had brought himself to sanction this agreement, that the archbishop 
might be willing to anoint his son Magnús king. Thus the money standard became doubled. 
King Sverrir demanded of the archbishop that the old legal satisfaction (lagaréttr inn forni) 
should stand in the archbishop’s as in the king’s suits, and declared that Erlingr skakki ought not 
to have broken the laws of King Óláfr the Saint to have his son anointed king.188 
King Sverrir presented his conflict with the Church as the defence of the traditional legal 
order hallowed by the name of the saint king. The extant sources indicate that the strife was 
considerably broader in scope than just the issue of the fines in ecclesiastical suits in the 
archbishop’s diocese. In sum, it concerned validity of the reforms undertaken in connection 
with the establishment of the Norwegian church province in 1152~53 and over the following 
quarter of the century.189 First, Sverrir vindicated lay control of the churches. Formerly the 
landowner who built a church on his estate claimed the right to appoint the priest and as a rule 
appropriated a part, and sometimes all, of the tithe and other church revenues for his use. This 
arrangement that modern historians commonly call the “proprietary church regime” 
(Eigenkirchentum) was banned by the new provincial statute, the so-called Canones 
Nidrosienses. The reforming clergy considered that the consecration of a church made it and 
all its possessions property of the saint patron to whom the altar was dedicated. The control of 
the churches should, in the opinion of the reformers, pertain only to the bishop. Second, 
Sverrir was unwilling to respect the canonical rules for choosing bishops. He claimed the right 
to present his candidate and have a voice at the election. Finally, he rejected the demands on 
the part of the Church to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all offences against ecclesiastical 
law and to judge all criminous clerks no matter what the issue might be. 
According to the saga, Archbishop Eiríkr sought to uphold his side of the argument citing 
the book called Gullfjöðr, “Golden Feather”, that had been compiled at the instigation of 
Archbishop Eysteinn, as well as “Roman law” (lög rúmversk), that is obviously, principles of 
the church’s ius commune, and letters from the pope. As for Sverrir, he tried all kinds of 
tactics to get his own way. The saga reports that he “always appealed to the law of the land, 
ordained by King Óláfr the Saint, and to the law-book of the Þrœndir, called Grágás, written 
                                                 
187 Cf. F 3.2, ed. Keyser and Munch in NgL 1: 148. 
188 Sverris saga 112, ed. Gustav Indrebø in Sverris saga etter Cod. AM 327 4º (Kristiania: Dybwad, 1920), p. 
119. The translation quoted is that of J. Sephton in The Saga of King Sverri, The Northern Library, vol. 4 
(London: Nutt, 1899), p. 140. 
189 For this and what follows cf. Erik Gunnes, Kongens ære, pp. 149–229; Knut Helle, Norge blir en stat, pp. 85–
90. 
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by command of King Magnús góði, the son of King Óláfr.” Sverrir insisted that the “old law 
and custom” were on his side.190 Other sources indicate, however, that he could equally well 
reverse his argument and claim that his position was fully justified by universally accepted 
norms of canon law.191 
Yet of all the points on which Sverrir took issue with Archbishop Eiríkr, it was the double 
fines in ecclesiastical suits that the saga brought into special prominence. The reason was 
apparently that it was difficult to deny that when the archbishopric had been organized and the 
questions of the control of churches, episcopal elections, and jurisdiction of church courts had 
been regulated according to the new principles, the reigning kings Ingi, Eysteinn, and Sigurðr 
had consented to the reforms. Moreover, Sverrir himself had earlier expressly confirmed the 
privileges that the church had obtained on that occasion, although neither the saga nor “A 
Speech against the Bishops”, a polemical treatise written by an anonymous supporter of 
Sverrir, mention this fact.192 The doubled fines were clearly a special case. The validity of this 
provision only rested on the consent of Erlingr skakki who was regent during the minority of 
King Magnús Erlingsson, and Sverrir was in this case in a better position to throw their 
agreement into question. He argued that it was merely a bargain (kaup) which Erlingr had 
made with the archbishop in order to get his son crowned and which went counter to the “laws 
of St Óláfr” in two respects at once: for one thing, because the size of the fines was laid down 
differently in the old book of the laws that ostensibly recorded the legislation of the saint king, 
and for the other, because Magnús should not have become king in the first place: 
                                                 
190 Sverris saga 117, ed. Indrebø, p. 122–23: “I þenna tima gerþuz margar greinir milli þeira Sverris konings oc 
erkibyscups. scaut konungr iafnan sinu mali til landzlaga þeira er sett hafði hinn helgi Olafr konungr. oc til 
lagabocar Þrænda. þeirar er colluð er Gragas er ritat hafði latit Magnus konungr hiN goði Olafs-son. Erkibyscup 
bað fram rekia þa boc er Gullfiauðr er colluð oc rita let Eysteinn erkibyscup. þar með bað hann log rumversc oc 
þat sumt er hann hafði til bref oc iNsigli pauans. Su var ein grein imilli þeira At þat varo forn log oc siðvenia at 
konungr oc bøndr scylldu lata gera kirkiur a bøiom sinum oc með sinum kostnaði ef þeir villdi. scylldu þeir raþa 
fyrir þeim kirkium oc raða presta til. […] En erkibiscup neitaði”; The Saga of King Sverri, p. 144. 
191 That was the argument of the so-called “Speech against the Bishops”, see Gunnes, Kongens ære, pp. 63–67, 
174–76, 203–17, 257–68, 299–307, 337–42, 352–57. 
192 See King Hákon Sverrisson’s letter to Archbishop Eiríkr and the other bishops from c. 1202, ed. R. Keyser 
and P. A. Munch in NgL 1: 445: “… and I promise to the holy church and the clergy that all the liberties which it 
should possess in agreement with what the holy canons (heilagar rittningar) provide by way of clarity between 
myself and them and which the holy church has had from ancient and modern times, without prejudice to my 
kingship and all royal dignity, as Cardinal Nicholas established and the three kings, Eysteinn, and Sigurðr, and 
Ingi, promised and swore, and as the charter of King Eysteinn attests, and as King Magnús confirmed, and also 
my father by his charter, and so as the oaths testify that were sworn in Cardinal Fidentius’ [Stephanus’?] 
presence.” 
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For Magnús was not rightly chosen, inasmuch as never before since Norway became Christian 
had one been king who was not a king’s son; nor yet in heathen times; it was also forbidden in 
the land’s law ordained by King Óláfr the Saint.193 
Later saga authors give a detailed report of the background of Magnús Erlingsson’s 
coronation. They visualize it as a conversation between the archbishop and the jarl. Erlingr 
was taking objection to the new tariff imposed by Eysteinn and appealing to the laws of 
St Óláfr. The archbishop was making the point that the real law-breaker was the jarl himself 
because he had his son chosen king: “He is king who is not a king’s son.” Erlingr’s 
counterargument, as presented by the writer of Fagrskinna, was subtle enough: 
“My lord, since it is not written in all books of laws that he who is not a king’s son is not to be 
king and since it was in accordance with your will and with that of the other bishops that 
Magnús was chosen king of the whole country, you can strengthen him and his power so that it 
will be God’s law that he is king.”194 
In Heimskringla, the conversation between the jarl and the archbishop developed along 
essentially the same line, but there Erlingr’s reasoning was founded on historical precedents: 
“William the Bastard was not a king’s son, yet he was consecrated and crowned king of 
England, and the royal power has remained in his line in England, and all have been crowned. 
Sveinn Úlfsson of Denmark was not a king’s son, yet he was crowned king, and his sons after 
him, and each of his successors in that line was a crowned king. […] Let us have a crowned 
king as have Englishmen and Danes.”195 
As we see, the saga authors are unanimous in that Magnús Erlingsson’ descent through the 
female branch of the royal family gave him no right to the throne, and the anointment was 
intended to substitute the lacking blood-right. Modern historians for the most part share their 
opinion.196 It is important to realize, however, that this assumption has no other foundation 
than the allegations of Sverrir himself, reproduced in Sverris saga, which in turn firmly set the 
cadre for the writers of Fagrskinna and Heimskringla. But was it the opinion of Magnús 
Erlingsson’s contemporaries? The question is quite meaningless in this form: different people 
may well have looked on the matter differently. There is evidence indicating that the king’s 
pedigree was not invariably construed as a detriment to his title. The anonymous author of the 
                                                 
193 Sverris saga 112, ed. Indrebø, p. 119; The Saga of King Sverri, p. 140. Cf. Sverrir’s words addressed to 
Magnús during their meeting in Bergen in 1181, Sverris saga 60, ed. Indrebø, p. 68: “þat varþ eN alldri fyR i 
Noregi at sa væri konungr callaðr er eigi var konungs son.” Two years earlier, standing at Erlingr’s grave, Sverrir 
reportedly said that one should pray to God for the jarl’s soul because the latter being only a baron (lendr maðr) 
had had the audacity to get his son chosen king, see Sverris saga 38, ed. Indrebø, p. 43. 
194 Fsk 108, ed. Bjarni Einarsson, p. 350. 
195 Hkr (MErl) 21, ed. Bjarni Aðalbjarnarson, p. 397; transl. Hollander, pp. 806–07. 
196 See most recently Knut Helle, Under kirke og kongemakt 1130–1350, Aschehougs Norgeshistorie, vol. 3 
(Oslo: Aschehoug, 1995), p. 34; Claus Krag, Norges historie fram til 1319 (Oslo: Universitetsforlag, 2000), 
p. 111. 
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poem Nóregs konunga tal composed in Iceland around 1190 lays particular stress on Magnús’ 
descent calling him “Kristín’s son” and apparently thinks of it as something honourable.197 In 
fact, Sverris saga itself says about Magnús that “his ancestry was the greatest advantage to 
him; for all the people of the land loved him because of it, preferring rather to serve a 
descendant of Sigurðr Jórsalafari than one of Haraldr Gilli.”198 For reasons of his own, the 
saga author might have somewhat exaggerated the extent of popular support enjoyed by 
Magnús Erlingsson’s regime,199 but there is no reason to doubt that his account accurately 
reflects the sentiments shared by quite a few people at that time. 
Now if we take a look at the history of royal succession in Norway, we will at once notice 
that power typically passed from father to son. However, this fact does not demonstrate, of 
itself, that there existed a conscious, verbalized norm excluding claimants through the female 
branch of the royal family from succession to the throne. In fact, there was a series of 
departures from the general trend that stretched back to the eleventh century, when Haraldr 
harðráði laid claim to the throne as Óláfr Haraldsson’s maternal half-brother, and included the 
anti-king Óláfr ógæfa in the 1160s, who was the son of Maria, Eysteinn Magnússon’s 
legitimate daughter, as well as the king of the Birkibeinar Ingi Bárðarson (1204–17), the son 
of Cecilía, King Sigurðr munnr’s daughter, and the king of the Baglar Philippús Símonarson 
(1207–17), the son of Margrét, King Ingi’s maternal half-sister. These exceptions were 
possible and in a way normal as long as there was no hereditary monarchy in the strict sense 
and the royal title was conferred through an act of election at the popular assembly.200 
Sverrir was at pains to present the practice of royal succession from father to son as a 
binding legal rule. Moreover, as we have seen, he brought it into association with St Óláfr’s 
name. It is far from certain whether in doing that he was able to rely on any pre-existent 
tradition. At any rate, neither the twelfth-century ecclesiastical sources nor the thirteenth-
century saga accounts of Óláfr’s reign imply that the saint king concerned himself with 
regulating the matters of succession to the Norwegian throne. We find, to be sure, an 
                                                 
197 Nóregs konunga tal 57, 68, and 70, in Skjd. 1B: 585, 587. On the dating of the poem see Finnur Jónsson, Lit. 
hist. 2: 110–13. 
198 Sverris saga 3, ed. Indrebø, p. 3; The Saga of King Sverre, p. 4. Cf. Magnús Erlingsson’s epitaph in Sverris 
saga 98, ed. Indrebø, p. 104: “oc hyGiom ver þes mest hafa at notit at ollu landz-folkino var sva kært alt af-
kvæmi Sigurðar konungs Iorsala-fara oc Eysteins konungs broþur hans.” 
199 Cf. Helle, Under kirke og kongemakt, p. 61; Sverre Bagge, From Gang Leader to the Lord’s Anoninted: 
Kingship in Sverris saga and Hákonar saga Hákonarsonar, The Viking Collection, vol. 8 (Odense: Odense 
University Press, 1996), p. 47–48, 82. 
200 Cf. Bull, Det norske folks liv og historie, pp. 191–92. See also Absalon Taranger, “Om kongevalg i Norge i 
sagatiden,” HT 30 (1934–36) 112, who comes to the conclusion that “som tronpretendenter til 
landskongedømmet er kongesønner (ekte og uekte) i Harald Hårfagres ætt fortrinsberettiget, men ikke 
eneberettiget. Folket kan også velge andre.” 
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unambiguous statement of the principle of agnatic succession in Snorri, but there it is ascribed 
to King Háraldr hárfagri.201 It is impossible to establish who of the two – Sverrir or Snorri – 
was more in agreement with the tradition. In choosing the originator of the assumed basic 
tenet of Norwegian succession law, Haraldr and Óláfr were, in fact, equally likely options. On 
the one hand, the Norwegian kings traced back their ancestry to Haraldr, they were his 
“stock” (ætt); on the other, Óláfr was also of capital importance in the self-understanding of 
the royal house: he brought with himself the Christian charisma, creating a new good fortune 
for the kindred and demonstrating God’s special blessing on the house; in other words, he was 
the family’s new beginning.202 Once it was assumed that the rule of agnatic succession had 
sometime been established as such, choosing between these two options became simply a 
matter of personal beliefs when not of practical expediency: in the predominantly oral culture 
of that time remembered truth was flexible enough and prone to smooth “updating”.203 
As the saga presents it, Sverrir’s contention that the succession to the Norwegian throne 
was by the “laws of St Óláfr” restricted to the members of the royal family descended in the 
mail line, only aimed to prove that Magnús Erlingsson’s had obtained his title in an 
illegitimate way. However, his argument also had far-reaching implications for the 
understanding of the role the hereditary principle played in king-making generally, and they 
were subsequently developed to a logical end in Sturla Þórðarson’s Hákonar saga 
Hákonarsonar. 
 
Hákonar saga Hákonarsonar 
 
The leading theme of the opening part of the saga is the protagonist’s predestination to 
become king. His fate is likened to that of Óláfr Tryggvason: As Óláfr and his mother Ástríðr 
had to flee the country in order to escape the power of Gunnhildr and her sons, so Hákon’s 
mother Inga with her little baby have to take flight from Viken swarming with the Baglar 
north to Nidaros, the stronghold of the Birkebeinar. On the way they experience hardships 
                                                 
201 Ólhelg (Sep) 1, ed. Johnsen and Jón Helgason, p. 8; Hkr (Hhárf) 33, ed. Bjarni Aðalbjarnarson 1: 136–37; 
transl. Hollander, p. 87: “When King Haraldr was fifty [sixty. – Ólhelg (Sep)] years old … [he] called a great 
assembly in the eastern part of the country to which he especially summoned the people in the Uppland 
disctricts. There he bestowed the title of ‘king’ on all his sons and put this into the laws that each of his 
descendants was to inherit a kingdom after his father, and an earldom, each who was of his kin on the female 
side (sá, er kvensift var af hans ætt kominn).” 
202 On Óláfr’s role as the dynasty’s Spitzenahn see particularly Erich Hoffmann, Die heiligen Könige bei den 
Angelsachsen und den skandinavischen Völkern: Königsheiliger und Königshaus, Quellen und Forschungen zur 
Geschichte Schleswig-Holsteins, vol. 69 (Neumünster: Wachholtz, 1975), pp. 83–89, cf. pp. 10–11. 
203 Cf. M. T. Clanchy, “Remembering the Past and the Good Old Law,” History 60 (1970) 165–76. 
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similar to those Óláfr and Ástríðr fell into on their journey. Finally, safe and sound, Hákon 
reaches the court of King Ingi and Jarl Hákon galinn who gladly accept him. The following 
account centres on the issue of Hákon’s rights to the throne as the lawful heir of his father, 
King Hákon Sverrisson. Anticipating later events, the saga author gives the reader to 
understand that from the very outset the matter has been clear as day to any unbiased person. 
Even the jarl himself, who takes the boy into his house and treats him as though he were his 
own son, often says that King Ingi and himself have the boy’s inheritance in their keeping.204 
That is to say, succession to the throne is subject to the same rules as transference of all other 
property: a heritage can by rights belong only to the heir even if he is a minor and cannot for 
the moment win satisfaction of his claim. The saga author is making a point that would be 
immediately taken by anyone familiar with the contemporary laws governing inheritance: 
If inheritance comes into the hands of a minor. If a man who seems to be the heir receives an 
inheritance and men present the claims of a minor and he [the minor] asserts that the one who 
has the inheritance in his possession (er í arf sitr) is not the right heir, his claim shall rest till he 
is fifteen winters old, when he shall himself prosecute his suit.205 
If a man has an unappraised inheritance in his keeping (sitr i arve uvirðum), one that was not 
assessed at the seventh-day ale, the minor [heir] shall go before the thing as soon as he comes of 
age; and let him present a sworn claim to as much property as he intends to demand under 
oath.206 
Developing his line of argument, Sturla gives a detailed report of the discussion of succession 
to the throne occasioned by King Ingi’s illness. This story plays no part in the development of 
the plot because Ingi recuperates, but Eyvindr prestsmágr, a rather obscure figure among the 
leaders of the Birkibeinar, gets an opportunity to state Hákon’s claim and to counter Skúli 
Bárðarson and other pretenders. In his speech which is characterized in the saga as an 
órskurðr, an authoritative decision on a point of law, Eyvindr makes it clear that there is no 
question of any of Ingi’s relatives inheriting the throne from him because it rightfully belongs 
not to Ingi but to young Hákon who is the heir of his father, King Hákon Sverrisson: 
“This matter … lies so light before the eyes of all men who know what is right and will speak 
truth … And if those both brothers were alive, jarl Hákon and King Ingi, on the day when 
                                                 
204 Hákonar saga Hákonarsonar 4, ed. Albert Kjær and Ludvig Holm-Olsen in Det Arnamagnæanske 
Haandskrift 81a Fol. (Skálholtsbók yngsta) (Kristiania / Oslo: Norsk historisk kjeldeskrift-institutt, 1910–86), 
p. 229: “Jarll … lysti þui opttliga fyrir sinum mơnnum, at þeir Jnge kongr badir satu j faudrarfi þessa sueins”; cf. 
Hákonar saga 5, ed. Kjær and Holm-Olsen, p. 302: “vier sitium j ættleifd hans ok faudrarfi.” 
205 F 9.27, ed. Keyser and Munch in NgL 1: 215; transl. Larson, p. 340. 
206 G 119, ed. Keyser and Munch in NgL 1: 52; transl. Larson, p. 115. 
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Hákon, the son of King Hákon were of full age, then he might go and claim from them his 
inheritance and turn them out of the throne and seat himself on it in their stead.”207 
Thus the similitude between succession to the throne and inheritance of property is brought to 
a logical extreme. Of the election as an instrument that confers royal powers, there is not a 
single word.  
Justifying Hákon’s claim to the throne, the saga writer lays particular emphasis on the 
distinction inherent in the male and the female lines of descent. Even Hákon’s enemies, the 
Baglar, are conscious of the capital importance of this distinction, and when Hákon falls for a 
while into their hands, one of them suggests taking him as their king since “we know the laws 
of King Óláfr the Saint: he is rightful king who is a king’s son, and not a daughter’s son or a 
sister’s son of kings as we now serve on both sides, Birkibeinar and Baglar.”208 Since Hákon’s 
right to the throne firmly rests on the “laws of St Óláfr”, the saint king becomes the 
protagonist’s special patron. We are told that Jarl Hákon and King Ingi made an agreement 
(einkamál) concerning succession to the throne, to the exclusion of Hákon Hákonarson, and 
their agreement was published at the Eyraþing assembly and sealed by the bishops. However, 
Hákon himself, then an eight-year-old boy, remains unruffled by the news remarking that “it 
is hard to see if this decision will hold out or not, because there was no my attorney 
(umbóðsmaðr) there to answer on my behalf.” When asked who his attorney is, the boy 
replies, “God and King Óláfr the Saint; into their hands have I put my claim, and they will see 
to it that I receive my share of the land and of luck.”209 
In 1217 King Ingi dies, and the question of succession arises. Despite the intrigues of his 
adversaries, Hákon Hákonarson becomes king. A few years pass, and finally, at the expense 
of much effort, the country is pacified. “But still there was a great claim on the king’s realm 
and heritage on behalf of those men who wished to push themselves up to the kingdom.”210 In 
order to settle the issue definitively, a national assembly gathers in Bergen in 1223. Four 
pretenders lay claims to the royal title and their share of the land: Jarl Skúli who was King 
Ingi’s half-brother, Gutthormr, Ingi’s illegitimate son, Sigurðr ribbungr, the son of Erlingr 
who in turn passed himself for King Magnús Erlingsson’s son, and there were also 
messengers from Knútr, the legitimate son of Jarl Hákon galinn. In the opinion of modern 
                                                 
207 Hákonar saga 9, ed. Kjær and Holm-Olsen, p. 306; transl. G. W. Dasent in The Saga of Hacon and a 
Fragment of The Saga of Magnus, vol. 4 of Icelandic Sagas and Other Historical Documents Relating to the 
Settlements and Descents of the Northmen on the British Isles, 4 vols., Rolls Series, vol. 88 (London: Eyre & 
Spottiswoode, 1887 –94), p. 15. 
208 Hákonar saga 4, ed. Kjær and Holm-Olsen, p. 300. 
209 Hákonar saga 6, ed. Kjær and Holm-Olsen, p. 303–04. 
210 Hákonar saga 85, ed. Kjær and Holm-Olsen, p. 375; transl. Dasent, p. 77. 
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historians, Hákon Hákonarson’s rights were not altogether beyond doubt from a legal point of 
view;211 in the account of the saga, however, the case is presented in a totally different light. 
All threads of the plot are skilfully drawn together in the account of this event; all arguments 
supporting the rightfulness of Hákon’s cause, scattered as they were over the preceding 
narrative, are now marshalled in order to produce a cumulative effect. The king is calm and 
confident that he is in the right: all his forefathers have ruled the country, “man after man, so 
that no female link has ever intervened,” so he is the true heir (óðalsmaðr) to Norway. 
Although Skúli insists that he is the lawful heir of his brother, King Ingi, and as such entitled 
to the throne according to the “laws of St Óláfr”, that is just a lamentable and to him 
ultimately fatal misapprehension, suggested to him by his wicked counsellors. The case is 
brought to the judgement of lawmen that gathered from different parts of Norway. Gunnarr 
bóndi, the oldest among them and the “wisest man in the country”, takes the floor and points 
to the incontestable authority that “knows what is true and tells the truth, whether it concerns 
rich or poor, but dreads no man that it may mislike someone,” that is, the “law-book of King 
Óláfr the Saint, which after his ordinance was made for all Norway, and which all Norwegian 
kings have since kept who wish to follow right.”212 And according to this law-book, only 
Hákon has the right to the throne. All other claims are nothing but false pretence: even if King 
Ingi were still alive, he would be required by law to renounce his title for the benefit of Hákon 
Hákonarson. Then other lawmen have their say, each concluding that Hákon is the only 
rightful king. The truth triumphs, and Hákon’s rivals are once and for all disgraced. 
To divide fact from fiction in this story written forty years after the events it describes is 
now virtually impossible. Much had changed in the country in the interim. The kingship had 
changed, too. In 1260 a new law had been published at the Frostuþing assembly by which 
succession to the throne had become automatic and the elective principle had been reduced to 
an act of acclamation at the Eyraþing assembly. Some peculiar turns of phrase in this law 
remind one of the episodes of Hákonar saga: it speaks of the heir to the throne as óðalborinn, 
“by birth entitled to his patrimony”; it grounds the hereditary right in the “laws of St Óláfr” 
and likens it to the “rights that every yeoman wishes to be allowed by others in regard to his 
inheritance”.213 We may suspect that the benefit of the hindsight that Sturla Þórðarson was 
able to enjoy, in many respects affected his account of the past events, but we can only 
                                                 
211 Halvdan Koht, “Skule jarl,” HT 5th ser., vol. 5 (1924) 430–34, points out that “det er fast regel i gamal tid at 
arven blir rekna ifrå siste kongen som har levd,” that is, from Ingi in this case, and not from Hákon Sverrisson; 
Koht also suggests that Skúli’s claim was in a good agreement with the ecclesiastical views on rights of 
succession. See also Bull, Det norske folks liv og historie, pp. 260–61; Bagge, From Gang Leader, pp. 98, 100. 
212 Hákonar saga 91, ed. Kjær and Holm-Olsen, p. 382; transl. Dasent, p. 82. 
213 NG 4–8, ed. Keyser and Munch in NgL 2: 308–10. Cf. Helle, Norge blir en stat, pp. 116–17. 
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speculate “how it was” in actuality.214 For our purposes it is more important that the evidence 
of Hákonar saga, however unreliable it may be as a foundation for reconstruction of the 
political collisions of the first quarter of the century, gives a very clear indication that the 
Norwegian kingship at some moment during Hákon’s reign, which does not lend itself to a 
more precise dating, put the notion of the “laws of St Óláfr” to use in order to justify 
foundational changes in the political system and turn Norway into a veritable hereditary 
monarchy. 
 
New and Old Law in King Hákon Hákonarson’s Ordinance against Homicide 
 
The extant version of the laws of the Frostathing Assembly, preserved in the seventeenth-
century copies of the lost medieval Codex Resenianus, opens with an ordinance issued by 
Hákon Hákonarson in c. 1260 that provides a sort of introduction to this book of laws. In 
many respects King Hákon’s ordinance marks a milestone in Norwegian legal history. To 
begin with, the king is acting, for the first time, as a sovereign legislator giving law on his 
own authority.215 The form of a solemn royal diploma given as it is to the ordinance highlights 
this fact: 
King Hákon, son of King Hákon and grandson of King Sverrir, sends the greetings of God and 
his own [greetings] to clerks and barons, freemen and farmers, those now living and those to 
come, and to all God’s friends and his own who now dwell in Norway.216 
Like in some earlier Norwegian legal enactments, counsel of secular and ecclesiastical 
magnates is said to have preceded the promulgation of the law but there is a significant 
difference between how this counsel functions in the older legislation and in King Hákon’s 
ordinance. If previously a law was occasionally said to have been accepted on the advice of 
the king and the magnates, now the monarch gives the law after a consultation with a chosen 
group of his subjects. 
                                                 
214 In this respect a privilege issued c. 1222 by Hákon Hákonarson for the benefit of the archbishop (Dipl Norv 3 
no. 1) is of particular interest. It says, “… we [King Hákon] have promised on our behalf and on the behalf of 
those who will legitimately (loglega) be chosen to [the government of] the country after us … to Archbishop 
Gutthormr and to all those who will canonically (gudlega) be chosen to the office of archbishop after him …” In 
other words, the king’s office is elective in the way that of archbishop is. Hereditary right to the throne does not 
even gets a mention. Cf. Sverre Steen, “Tronfølgeloven av 1163 og konungstekja i hundreåret etter,” HT 35 
(1949–51) 43. 
215 Cf. Knut Helle, Norge blir en stat, p. 226. 
216 F i. 1, ed. Gustav Storm in NgL 4: 19: “Hakon konongr son Haconar konongs sunarson Suærris konongs 
senðer lenndom ok lærðom buonðom ok buðegnom veranðom ok viðr komanðom ollom guðs vinom ok sinom 
þeim sem Noreg byggia guðs ok sina”; transl. Larson, p. 213. 
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The concern that led King Hákon to issue the new law is expressed in clear terms in the 
preamble: it necessary to reduce homicide (at minka mandrapin) in the country. We are told 
that endless blood feuds are wreaking havoc on the kingdom. Worst of all, private vengeance 
often strikes innocent people, indeed the best men of a given family. This practice has ossified 
into a custom (i uenio) but it is a bad custom and as such it must be abolished.217 Therefore 
the ordinance imposes a penalty of outlawry for everyone who avenges themselves not on the 
offender but on his relatives, and yet even those who take revenge directly on the offender 
must incur the same heavy punishment in case the king has chosen to pardon him. 
The radical changes introduced in penal law by King Hákon’s ordinance marked a turning 
point in the development of administration of justice in medieval Norway.218 Outlining the 
trend with a measure of simplification, we may say that originally most criminal offences 
were considered as violations of private rights and led to extra-judicial vengeance and 
compensation. The dominance of self-help was mainly the result of a general weakness of 
public authority. A dramatic growth of royal power in Norway in the High Middle Ages made 
it possible for the king and his officials to effectively take over the function of settlement of 
conflicts and maintenance of order.219 Gradually a legal framework was provided for the 
king’s interference in these matters. A number of laws concerning the preservation of peace 
and giving the king the power to prosecute certain crimes were enacted during the latter half 
of the twelfth century,220 and this tendency was further institutionalised with King Hákon’s 
ordinance of 1260. 
However, the rise of efficient administrative machinery could not have been the sole 
reason for the developments in law. Another powerful factor was indubitably the influence of 
the church who regarded a crime as an encroachment on the divinely instituted order and thus 
                                                 
217 The distinction between good (rational) and bad (irrational) customs stems evidently from the learned law, 
see Brie, Die Lehre vom Gewohnheitsrecht, pp. 24–32, 69–71, 75–78, 114, 117–18; René Wehrlé, De la coutume 
dans le droit canonique: Essai historique (Paris: Sirey, 1928), pp. 111–19. In medieval Norway influence of this 
concept is noticeable from the latter half of the twelfth-century on, see the description of St Óláfr’s enemies in 
Passio Olavi where an opposition between consuetudo and ratio is brought into high relief, ed. F. Metcalfe, 
p. 69. This set of ideas played a significant role in the history of medieval legislation. Presenting the interference 
of the government with various aspects of legal and social life as abolishment of a bad custom had a long 
tradition by the time of Hákon Hákonarson. The Norwegian document is directly comparable in this respect to 
ordinances of thirteenth-century French kings who repeatedly resorted to the notion of a “bad custom” in their 
attempt to restrain private wars of the feudal aristocracy, see François Olivier-Martin, “Le roi de France et les 
mauvaises coutumes au moyen âge,” ZRG GA 58 (1938) 117, 122–23, 136. 
218 Poul Gædeken, Retsbrudet og Reaktionen derimod i gammeldansk og germansk Ret (København: Gad, 1934), 
pp. 189–95. 
219 Helle, Norge blir en stat, pp. 186–89. 
220 See G 32, F 2.10 and 5.44–46, and the statute issued in 1189~90 by an ecclesiastical synod where King 
Sverrir probably participated, ed. R. Keyser and P. A. Munch in NgL 1: 19–20, 134, 182–83, 409. Cf. Absalon 
Taranger, Udsigt over den norske rets historie, 2 vols., Kristiania: Cammermeyer, 1898–04) 2: 194–95; 
Gædeken, Retsbrudet, pp. 204–8. 
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an offence against God. According to her teaching, the punishment of criminals was one of 
the king’s foremost duties.221 In Norway, the ecclesiastical doctrine had exercised noticeable 
influence on the representation of the monarchy long before the king’s role in prosecution of 
crimes assumed legally established forms. Eleventh-century court scalds commonly referred 
to their patrons by circumlocutions such as the “enemy of plunderers (thieves, etc.)”.222 In the 
twelfth century the motif of the king curbing wrongdoers and penalizing “those whose own 
wickedness and persistence in evil had already condemned them” featured prominently in the 
ecclesiastical literature about St Óláfr.223 
By that token, it is not surprising that an ordinance declaring a “war on crime” should 
have had recourse to the image of the saint king. However, the specific form it has assumed in 
King Hákon’s ordinance of 1260 may raise certain bewilderment at first glance. Although as 
we have seen, the king is acting in the role of a sovereign lawgiver, he does not publish the 
norms set out in his ordinance as his own establishment. What is clearly a dramatic legal 
change from the prospective of the modern historian, the idiom of the document presents as a 
restoration of the laws once given by the king’s sainted predecessor but formerly neglected: 
“We thought it most befitting, to begin with, that the laws of King Óláfr the Saint are to stand 
as he had established them, although this has not been observed heretofore owing to 
avarice.”224  
Yet from the point of view of contemporary European legal thought, the statement was 
entirely consistent with King Hákon’s legislative ambitions. The topos of “renovating” or 
“restoring” law as it had been in old days (rather than “replacing” one law by another) was 
                                                 
221 The theme is pervasive in ecclesiastical literature. The words of the English author Wulfstan (d. 1023) may 
serve a good illustration, see The Institutes of Polity 2.6–8, ed. Karl Jost in Die ‘Institutes of Polity, Civil and 
Ecclesiastical’, Ein Werk Erzbischof Wulfstans von York, Schweizer anglistische Arbeiten, vol. 47 (Bern: 
Francke, 1959), pp. 44–46; transl. Michael Swanton in Anglo-Saxon Prose (London: Dent; Totowa, N.J.: Rowan 
and Littlefield, 1975), p. 126: “…And it behoves him diligently to support those who desire righteousness, and 
strictly punish those who desire perversity. He must severely correct wicked men with worldly punishment, and 
he must loathe and suppress robbers and plunderers and despoilers of the world’s goods, and sternly resist all 
God’s foes. And with justice he must be both merciful and austere: merciful to the good and stern to the evil.” 
222 Rudolf Meissner, Die Kenningar der Skalden, Ein Beitrag zur skaldischen Poetik (Bonn: 
Schroeder, 1921), p. 362. The idea was emphasized with particular strength by Arnórr jarlaskald who addressed 
King Magnús Óláfsson three times in this way in a not particularly long praise poem, see his Hrynhenda 12 and 
17 (bis), in Skjd. B I, 309 and 310; Diana Whaley, The Poetry of Arnórr jarlaskáld: An Edition and Study, 
Westfield Publications in Medieval Studies, vol. 8 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998), pp. 166–68, 176–78. We cannot 
agree with Klaus von See’s contention that such expressions solely reflected the scalds’ concern with justifying 
systematical elimination of political opponents of the Norwegian royal power as a “war on crime”, see his 
“Strafe im Altnordischen,” Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum 108 (1979) 286, 297. 
223 Theodoricus Monachus, Historia de antiquitate regum Norwagiensium 16, ed. Gustav Storm in MHN, p. 29. I 
cite the translation of David and Ian McDougall in An Account of the Ancient History of the Norwegian Kings, 
transl. David and Ian McDougall, Viking Society for Northern Research, Text series, vol. 11 (London: Viking 
Society for Northern Research, University College London, 1998), pp. 21–22.  
224 F i.1, ed. Storm in NgL 4: 20: “Lizt oss þat licazt til at upphafe. at log inns helga Olafs konongs stanðe efter 
þui sęm hann hafðe skipat. þo at þess hafe æigi her til gæt verit fyrer fę girnðar saker.” 
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pervasive in medieval legislative rhetoric. As so many other clichés used by medieval 
lawgivers, it originated in the language of Roman jurisprudence. Emperor Justinian declared 
his intention to make a single law covering the subject, “which would renew and emend all 
previous [laws], and add what was lacking and cut away what was superfluous.” The theme 
was subsequently picked up by a number of post-Roman kings who drew heavily upon the 
imperial model in their self-representation.225 With the revival of royal legislation in the High 
Middle Ages the topos of “renovation” was again in full vogue. It was not only well known in 
Scandinavia but could even assume very elaborate forms, as in a decree against homicide that 
King Knut VI of Denmark issued in 1200 for Scania: 
And though it belongs to the royal power to lay down and alter laws we do not establish this law 
from scratch but recall it to the human memory from which it has slipped away, as one 
instituted since ancient times and obscured by the fogs of ignorance and by the multitude of 
years which are the mother of oblivion.226 
It seems likely then that the drafters the Norwegian ordinance lifted their peculiar turn of 
phrase from a common stock of juristic rhetoric that was in use in the medieval West. The 
document they were framing was to all appearances the outcome of the Norwegian 
monarchy’s first self-conscious attempt at sovereign lawgiving. Obviously, the situation 
prompted them to look for suitable models in the practice of royal chancelleries elsewhere in 
Europe. But it is equally clear that the same circumstance must concomitantly have led them 
to ponder over their words and from a multiplicity of current topoi to pick out the most fitting 
in order to communicate their message. Presumably the drafters of the ordinance expected 
that the gesture of “giving back” the old law that the king was making to the subjects would 
be readily understandable at least for the more educated part of their audience. 
 
                                                 
225 Justinian, Nov. 7 pr.: “Quod etiam in omni legislatione facientes credimus et in alienationibus, quae fiunt 
super sacris rebus, una complecti lege, quae priores omnes renovet et emendet et quod deest adiciat et quod 
superfluum est abscidat.” Gerhard Dilcher, “Gesetzgebung als Rechtserneuerung. Eine Studie zum 
Selbstverständnis der mittelalterlichen Leges,” in Rechtsgeschichte als Kulturgeschichte: Festschrift für Adalbert 
Erler zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Hans-Jürgen Becker et al. (Aalen: Scientia, 1976), pp. 13–35, gives a very subtle 
analysis of the motif in the legislation of early medieval kings. On reminiscences of Justinian’s Novel in Anglo-
Saxon sources see Patrick Wormald, The making of English law: King Alfred to the twelfth century, 2 vols. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1999–2003) 1: 129, 133, 277–85, 406. 
226 Statutum Kanuti regis de homicidio et illi contingentibus, ed. Svend Aakjær and Erik Kroman in Danmarks 
gamle landskabslove med kirkelovene, 8 vols. (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1933–61) 1 : 777: “Quamuis autem 
regie sit potestatis leges condere vel mutare, legem hanc ex nouo non condimus, sed ab antiques temporibus 
constitutam et annorum multitudine, que obliuionis mater est, ignorancie nebulis obfuscatam ad humanam a qua 
lapsus est memoriam reuocamus.” Cf. Poul Johs. Jørgensen, “Manddrabsforbrydelse i den skaanske Ret fra 
Valdemarstiden,” in Festskrift udgivet af Københavns Universitet i Anledning af Universitetets Aarsfest, 
November 1922 (Copenhagen: Københavns Universitet, 1922), pp. 16–18, 26–27, 77–86. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
We will now briefly summarize the overall points that have been made all along in the 
process of this study. 
An examination of the genesis of the notion of the “laws of St Óláfr” leaves us with more 
open questions than certain answers. There are no reasons to believe that Óláfr Haraldsson’s 
well-established reputation of a legislator among his contemporaries provided a natural point 
of departure for the subsequent growth of the legend. In other words, to explain the 
development of the tradition about the “laws of St Óláfr” mainly in terms of increasing 
fictionalisation of the historical fact would seem to oversimplify the problem.  
The association of Óláfr’s name with the good law of the past seem to have its origins in 
the time following the king’s death in the battle of Stiklestad, when Norway came under the 
Danish rule and the new regime was determined to impose on the populace a heavier burden 
of public service, severer penalties for violence, and new forms of taxation. This situation 
could not but prompt comparisons with the good old days, with the time when Óláfr, 
venerated now as a saint, reigned in Norway. The subsequent abolishment of the “laws of 
Álfífa”, as these provisions were commonly called, was presented as restoration of the legal 
status of the “days of St Óláfr”. The latter notion quickly lost connection with its original 
context, and the legal order of the “days of St Óláfr”, or what it was thought to have been, 
became a reference point with which usages and customs of the day could be compared and 
judged. An appeal to the “days of St Óláfr” was sometimes occasioned by a situation when 
instability of the established order of things was felt and the need arose to secure oneself 
against potential infringements on one’s rights. There must have been a direct link between 
these references to the “days of St Óláfr” and the concomitant growth of the legendary 
tradition about the laws of the saint king. 
The revision of Gulaþingsbók in the reign of Magnús Erlingsson, which resulted in the 
division of its contents into the “Óláfr” and the “Magnús” texts, furthered the tendency to 
associate all old-established law with St Óláfr’s name. There is, however, no reason to think 
that the juxtaposition of the new laws with the old ones, attributed as they were to Óláfr, 
testified to the reluctance on the part of the editors of the law-book to unconditionally 
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acknowledge the validity of the former. The framers of Gulaþingsbók seemed not so much to 
oppose “Magnús” to “Óláfr” as to thematize continuity between the past and the present in a 
manner that broadly resembled Bernard of Chartres’ image of the dwarfs sitting on the 
shoulders of giants. 
The ecclesiastical literature about the saint king dating from the 1160s and 70s had a 
formative influence on the development of Óláfr’s image as legislator. The life of the saint, 
Passio Olavi, attached much importance to the part his laws had played in establishing a right 
balance between different social layers, in regulating the relationships between the church and 
the secular society, and in imposing legal limitations on the king’s power. The author built up 
his account of Óláfr’s legislation drawing upon stock themes of contemporary European 
political and legal thought. Other ecclesiastical writers brought into prominence the idea that 
the saint king’s legislation was still upheld and venerated by all good men.  
By the end of the twelfth century the theme of the “laws of St Óláfr” began to play an 
important part in legitimising claims to the power. Sverrir utilized it in his struggle with 
Magnús Erlingsson and the church. He asserted that according to the “laws of St Óláfr” only a 
king’s son could legitimately be chosen king. There are reasons to believe not only that this 
principle actually had nothing to do with Óláfr, but also that it had never been recognized as a 
binding legal norm before. This motif was further elaborated in the royal propaganda under 
Hákon Hákonarson and served to justify the struggle for hereditary succession to the throne.  
In the late years of Hákon’s reign the “laws of St Óláfr” penetrated in virtually every nook 
and cranny of political and legal life in Norway. They were to provide an ultimate measure of 
the acceptable and the equitable to king and subject. As such they were invoked in the oath 
the king swore at his accession and in the subjects’ oath of allegiance. Finally, legal reform 
was presented as restoration of the “laws of St Oláfr” that had previously fallen into disregard. 
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